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I. THE NEED TO PRESERVE-AN INTRODUCTION
Irreplaceable cultural resources of this country's built environment are
being sacrificed in favor of more intensive urban development. Open space
and farmland continue to be converted to low density development. Gone
from Chicago's cityscape are the Old Stock Exchange building and Garrick
Theater. New York City has lost the famed Pennsylvania Theater. Over one-
third of the 16,000 structures listed in the Historic American Buildings
Survey, initiated by the federal government in 1933, have been destroyed.1
Since World War II an average of 1.4 million acres of farmland, an area
larger than Delaware, has been converted by development each year. 2 In
some areas, recent rates of conversion are extraordinary. For example,
twenty-one square miles per year are developed in the San Francisco Bay
f Third Year Law Student, Yale University, B.A. 1968, University of Massachusetts at
Amherst; M.R.P. 1973, University of North Carolina. This article received Yale Law School's
Ivan Meitus Prize as the outstanding city planning work of the 1976-1977 academic year.
1. 3. CosTONis, SPACE ADRIFT 4 (1974). For a description of problems in historical
preservation and accounts of specific successes and failures, see J. BARNETT, URBAN DESIGN
AS PUBLIC POLICY 70-83 (1974); Gilbert, Saving Landmarks, 22 HIST. PRESERVATION 13 (1970);
M. McElroy, A Preservation Plan for Honolulu's Financial District Landmarks (Sept. 1974)
(unpublished paper, University of Hawaii Dep't of Urban and Regional Planning) (copy on file
with author).
2. Suddenly, An Alarm over Vanishing Farms, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 15,
1975, at 67. For additional comment on the conservation of farmland, see BUREAU OF COM-
PREHENSIVE PLANNING, DIVISION OF STATE PLANNING, FLORIDA DEP'T OF ADMINISTRATION, THE
GREEN PLAN (2d ed. 1975); M. CLAWSON, SUBURBAN LAND CONVERSION IN THE UNITED STATES
(1971); COMMITTEE ON THE PRESERVATION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND, MARYLAND DEP'T OF
AGRICULTURE, FINAL REPORT (1974); GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE FOR THE PRESERVATION OF
AGRICULTURAL LAND, FINAL REPORT (1974) (Connecticut); COOPERATIVE EXTENSION SERVICE,
COOK COLLEGE, RUTGERS, HIGHLIGHTS OF REPORT OF THE BLUEPRINT COMMISSION ON THE
FUTURE OF NEW JERSEY AGRICULTURE (1973), summarized in Sullivan, Panel Offers a Plan to
Save Farmland, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1973, at 57, col. 1; THE USE OF LAND (W. Reilly ed.
1973); Saving the Farms, TIME, Apr. 21, 1975, at 48. Total conversion of cropland to other uses
is 2 1/2 million acres per year, but this is offset in part by 1 1/4 million acres of other land
brought into use each year, typically after improvement. R. SNYDER, AGRICULTURAL LAND USE
POLICY 5 (University of Minnesota Agricultural Extension Service Report No. P76-11, 1976)
(citing ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, MISC. PUB. No. 1230, OUR
LAND AND WATER RESOURCES, CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE SUPPLIES AND USES (1974)). The
relative importance of "extensive" land uses as compared to "intensive" land uses such as
urban development is evidenced by the fact that grazing, forestry and cropland are 34, 32 and
23% respectively of the land area in the 48 contiguous states. Madden, Land As a Natural
Resource, in THE GOOD EARTH OF AMERICA 6 (C. Harriss ed. 1974).
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area, 3 and of the 90,000 acres of agricultural land in Suffolk County, Long
Island, in 1950 only 50,000 acres remain undeveloped.
4
The concern over these changes in land use reflects a recognition that
this process of conversion is largely irreversible. In addition, the desire for
preservation implies that Americans are beginning to understand that the
economic basis for the intensification in land use does not fully comprehend
the public good. The success of the preservation programs, however, has
been substantially limited to those efforts in which property owners have
actively and aggressively sought self-restraint and protection. 5 As this in-
troduction indicates, existing strategies for preservation have proved inade-
quate in other circumstances. The transfer of development rights (TDR) is a
new development guidance technique that may be able to help preserva-
tionists in their efforts to abate the loss of urban amenities and the conver-
sion of open space.
A. The Inadequacy of Accepted Strategies for Preservation
At least four accepted development guidance instruments have been
used in preservation plans: conventional zoning, density zoning, tax relief
and direct purchase.
1. Conventional Zoning
Historic districts 6 are now a common and accepted means of increasing
control over those changes in appearance that tend to reduce the value of
3. LAND USE, OPEN SPACE AND THE GOVERNMENT PROCESS 3 (E. Smith & D. Riggs eds.
1974). Between 1945 and 1976 California farmland was reduced from 16 to 12 million acres,
prompting preservation legislation. Fighting forthe Farmlands, L.A. Times, Aug. 26, 1976, § 2,
at 6, col. 1; Goff, Assembly OK's Bill to Preserve Farm Land, L.A. Times, Jan. 30, 1976, § 2, at
1, col. 5. The Senate Finance Committee stopped the bill. Coast Bill to Save Farms Defeated,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1976, at 47, col. 2; Gillam, Senate Kills Bill to Protect Farmland, L.A.
Times, Aug. 24, 1976, § I, at 3, col. 5.
4. Gupte, State Pushing to Save Open Spaces; Zoning, Tax Cuts and Development Rights
Used, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1975, at 41, col. I. New Jersey, which is the third leading producer
of fruits and vegetables, lost 650,000 acres of farmland during the period 1950-1975. In the last
20 years Connecticut's farmland has been reduced from 1.6 million acres to less than .5 million
acres. Gupte, Land Hunger Thins Region's Farms, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1976, § 8, col. 1.
Reportedly, 1000 farms a week nationally are going out of business. Dirtying the Soil, N.Y.
Times, May 29, 1974, at 41, col. 2. And four million acres a year are converted to housing
subdivisions. King, Farm Land Prices Soar; Some Up 30% in 2 Years, N.Y. Times, June 9,
1974, at 1, col. 2.
5. The Vieux Carre district of New Orleans is one area where restrictions have been
actively sought. The Louisiana constitution even provides for the district's protection. LA.
CONST. art. 6, § 17; see J. COSTONIS, supra note 1, at 18. For further evidence of New Orleans'
efforts to protect and improve its urban resources, see Gregson, New Orleans Creates CBD
Taxing District, 6 PRAc. PLANNER, Dec. 1976, at 43. For a discussion of the successful open
space plan in Boulder, Colorado, see note 216 infra.
6. Historic districts are not unlike the conventional residential, commercial and industrial
zones typically found in community land use zoning. In historic districts or zones, property
nearby properties of historical significance. 7 The Vieux Carre district in
New Orleans exemplifies successful utilization of historical district zoning
8
Imposition of exclusive agricultural zones has precipitated extensive
litigation and, although no bright line can be drawn, zones of low density
may be judicially acceptable-especially when it can be shown that devel-
opment poses a substantial risk to the environment. 9 Timed development
and moratoria, techniques that planners discussed in hushed voices only a
few years ago, have found acceptance in some courts. 10 All these zoning
approaches are characteristically negative and reactive. At best, as in the
case of historical districts, they provide a more stable environment for
planning and implementing independent improvements. At worst, they are
instrumentalities of purposeful exclusion.11
2. Density Zoning
Flexible zoning techniques including clustering, planned unit devel-
opment (PUD), special districting, impact zoning and mixed use districting
are accepted alternatives intended to alleviate the rigidity of Euclidean lot
zoning. 12 More recently there have been proposals to develop inclusionary
zoning schemes reflecting the increasing concern with "fair share" alloca-
owners may be required to request permission from a local historic district commission before
they make external changes to their buildings. These are often "floating zonds"; that is, the
district regulation is applied to a given area only after statutory criteria are met. For an example
of enabling legislation, see CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-147 to -1471(1972 & Cum. Supp. 1977). For a
general discussion of historic districts and suggested zoning provisions, see F. BAIR, PLANNING
CITIES 358, 436-51 (1970).
7. See J. COSTONIS, supra note 1, at 18-19.
8. See note 5 supra.
9. See Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972) (upheld
six acre minimum lot size in forest conservation district); Gisler v. County of Madera, 38 Cal.
App. 3d 303, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1974) (upheld agricultural district with 18 acre minimum lot
size); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973) (upheld floodplain zone provisions that prohibited most construc-
tion). For a detailed discussion of an attempt at area-wide, low-density zoning, see Savage &
Sierchia, The Adirondack Park Agency Act: A Regional Land Use Plan Confronts "The Taking
Issue," 40 ALB. L. REy. 447 (1976).
10. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975)
(held controlled growth ordinance constitutional), noted in 54 N.C.L. REv. 266 (1976); Golden
v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972) (upheld devel-
opment timing). For an overview of the problems presented by growth controls, see Hughes,
Dilemmas of Suburbanization and Growth Controls, 422 ANNALS, Nov. 1975, at 61.
11. A comprehensive collection of materials on problems of exclusionary land use is to be
found in I MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF GROWTH 439-64 (R. Scott ed. 1975).
12. See Roberts & Bush, Managed Growth Overview and Analysis, 19 ENVT'L COM., Mar.
1975, at 1. The term "Euclidean" refers to the lot-by-lot, comprehensive land use zoning
validated by the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926). An example of the use of the term is to be found in C. BERGER, LAND
OWNERSHIP AND USE § 14.2 (2d ed. 1975). The term has taken on a somewhat pejorative
connotation and is typically used in a context where lot zoning is seen as restrictive, rigid and
negatory.
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tions of housing for people of varied socioeconomic classes, life styles and
life cycle stages. 13 These flexible techniques, working within the proven
structure of existing zoning ordinances, have provided planners and devel-
opers with the leeway necessary for more effective site design, but have




Various tax strategies attempt to alleviate the economic pressure to
convert historical buildings and open spaces to more intensive uses. The Tax
Reform Act of 1976 includes provisions for rapid amortization of the costs
of rehabilitating historic buildings 5 and charitable contribution deductions
for the conveyance of partial interests in land. 16 Differential taxation of open
space, which includes preferential assessment, deferred taxation and restric-
tive agreements, is provided under the statutes of forty-two states.1 7 A
recent report by the Council on Environmental Quality, however, concludes
that differential taxing can do no more than delay conversion; moreover, it
is an inefficient holding action because of its high expense. 18
4. Direct Purchase
Without question, public acquisition of a fee simple interest is an
effective preservation technique. 19 Though authorized in a number of states,
its use is limited because of several obstacles to the widespread public
purchase of land. Chief among them is a lack of financial resources.20
13. Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land Use Controls, 22 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 509, 523, 528-31 (1971).
14. In one study of a planned unit development, researchers found that "[t]he myth of a
variety of income groups quickly disappeared. The differential in family incomes required for
this group of townhouses was almost nil . R. BURCHELL & J. HUGHES, PLANNED UNIT
DEVELOPMENT 117 (1972).
15. I.R.C. § 191. See also A TaxBreakfor Cities, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1976, at 40, col, 2.
16. I.R.C. § 170(0(3). The effect of these provisions is not yet clear, but some unanti-
cipated consequences, including an effort to have the 18-year-old Seagram's Building in New
York designated an historical landmark, have occurred. See Newer Landmarks, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 13, 1976, at 22, col. 1.
17. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, UNTAXING OPEN SPACE 119 (1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as UNTAXING OPEN SPACE].
18. Id. at 118.
19. For thoughtful discussions on the efficacy of public land ownership as a means of
controlling development, see Hall, A Review of Policy Alternatives, in PUBLIC LAND OWN-
ERSHIP 46-57 (N. Roberts ed. 1976); Hamilton, CriticalPerspectives on Public Land Ownership,
in PUBLIC LAND OWNERSHIP, supra at 57-62.
20. Rose, A Proposal for the Separation and Marketability of Development Rights as a
Technique to Preserve Open Space, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 635, 639 (1974), excerpts reprinted in
TRANSFER OF DtVELOPMENT RIGHTS 186 (J. Rose ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as TDR].
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Thus, the accepted strategies of preservation are inadequate not only
because they may include undesirable effects, such as exclusion of low
income housing or economic inefficiency, but also because they fail to
prevent conversion of valued amenities including historic buildings, farm-
land and open space. The improvement of existing development guidance
instruments or the application of new techniques is necessary to effect
change in the economic calculus that presently provides incentives for
intensifying land use in the built environment and at the developing fringe.
B. Transferable Development Rights-An Overview
Within the last few years TDR has been developed as a technique with
the potential to augment existing controls over the conversion of open space
and historic structures to more intensive and less desired uses. TDR's
promise is a matter of controversy. It lies somewhere between the polar
views of Ada Louise Huxtable, who called one program "a brilliant,
practical, progressive extension of existing zoning tools,"21 and one student
commentator, who argued that another TDR program was not only uncon-
stitutional, but unreliable as a technique for preserving urban amenities.22
While planners will surely confound TDR by unnecessary elaboration,
the technique is disarmingly simple. TDR recognizes that a specific parcel
of land represents two additive value elements: the existing use value and
the development potential or community value. For example, a 100 acre
farm with a market value of $100,000 consists of $50,000 of existing use
value and $50,000 of development value attributable to its potential conver-
sion to a more intensive use such as a residential subdivision. Similarly, a
landmark building or private urban park may carry a market value exceeding
its present use value if it fails to exhaust the existing or anticipated devel-
opment potential. While accepted density zoning techniques such as cluster-
ing and PUD allow a developer to concentrate the total parcel density in one
or more nodes of a single site,23 TDR goes an important step further. It
permits all or part of the density potential of one tract of 'land to be
21. Huxtable, A Plan for Chicago, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1973, § D, at 28, col. 2, 5. An
editorial discussing the Tudor Parks use of TDR, see text accompanying notes 103-16 infra, said
The alternative solutions suggested by the planners are all aimed at the preserva-
tion of the parks, in whole or in part, through a set of proposals to give Harry
Helmsley, owner of Tudor City, his cake and allow the city to eat it, too.
It is] a responsible, sensitive, progressive and creative answer within the
framework of law, economic reality and the growing awareness of the environment.
The Tudor City Parks, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1972, at 46, col. 2. As it turned out, TDR in this case
was more like Marie Antoinette's "Let them eat cake!"
22. Note, Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338, 370 (1972).
23. For a general introduction to clustering and PUD, see PRINCIPLES AND PRACrICES OF
URBAN PLANNING 431, 480-83 (W. Goodman & E. Freund eds. 1968).
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transferred to a noncontiguous parcel and even to land owned by someone
else. Variants of TDR include schemes in which development rights are held
in certificate form by speculators or publicly purchased and deposited in
development rights banks for subsequent sale.24 Also, governmental units or
private entities, such as conservation groups, might purchase development
rights with the intention of eliminating forever the further development of
certain parcels. Thus, with TDR the development rights continue in exist-
ence in use on another parcel. When there is a purchase of development
rights (PDR) with no intention of using the development potential on
another parcel, however, the development rights are extinguished.25
The parcel from which the rights are conveyed is typically either in an
area called a preservation zone 26 or a piece of land that stands alone and
supports a designated historical structure. The parcel that receives the
development rights is in a prelimited transfer zone. The owner of a receiving
parcel, who purchases development rights from the owner of land in the
preservation zone, will be permitted to develop his land beyond the bulk or
density normally allowed under the applicable zoning regulations.
27
Presumably, TDR assists in the resolution of what planners call the
windfall-wipeout problem.28 Public planning and development have often
provided windfall profits for landowners with property either proximate to
public improvements or located in areas that are assigned new zoning
classifications permitting more intensive development. 29 Wipeouts occur
when public decisionmaking reduces the development potential or utility of
land.30 TDR has the potential for closing the windfall-wipeout loop by (1)
24. J. COSTONIS, supra note 1, at 40; SEDWAY/COOKE, CENTRAL SONOMA COUNTY-
DENSITY TRANSFER PROJECT 67-68 (1976).
25. TDR and PDR are only occasionally separated for purposes of discussion in this paper
because they are more similar than different in most respects. And as shall be seen in the
proposal for a "workable plan," see text accompanying notes 315-41 infra, an admixture of
TDR and PDR may be desirable.26. The term "preservation zone" implies that the TDR program contemplates the preser-
vation of only the most important areas of farmland and open space or only those historic
structures of substantial importance. See text accompanying notes 153-58 infra for a discussion
regarding the difficulties of using TDR as a comprehensive land planning technique.
27. The selection of suitable transfer zones is a critical planning problem because the
transfer of development potential necessarily results in an increase in density at the receiving
site. See Note, supra note 22.
28. See Cutler, The Dilemmas of Modern Zoning, 27 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Apr.
1975, at 6, 9; Hagman, A New Deal: Trading Windfallsfor Wipeouts, 40 PLAN., Sept. 1974, at 9;
Hagman, Windfalls and Wipeouts, in THE GOOD EARTH OF AMERICA, supra note 2, at 109,
excerpts reprinted in TDR, supra note 20, at 265.
29. The paradigmatic case of such windfall profit is the siting of a highway interchange on
rural land of marginal agricultural productivity.
30. Military base closings, for example, depress local property values. More commonly,
downzoning, that is, reclassification of zone districts to less intensive uses, causes wipeouts.
Designation of restrictive flood plain zones, for example, reduces development potential and
[Vol. 56
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providing a means of compensating landowners whose property is restricted
(they may sell their development rights) and (2) making landowners in more
intensively developed transfer zones pay for the right to develop beyond
existing densities (they must purchase development rights from preservation
zone landowners).
Both the volume of literature on TDR and actual applications of the
technique have increased markedly over the last five years. The strong
impetus for TDR use developed first in New York City in the late 1960's31
as part of a plan to avoid the loss of such landmarks as the Grand Central
Terminal.32 The "New York Plan" has proved problematical for numerous
reasons. The foremost of these was the failure of the City Planning Commis-
sion to recognize certain critical economic dynamics and its ad hoc approach
to TDR.
33
An alternative to the New York Plan for historical preservation is the
"Chicago Plan," promoted by Professor Costonis but never put into ef-
fect. 34 The Chicago Plan overcame many difficulties of the New York City
provisions, but confounded what should have been a simple scheme by
adding a development rights bank and making participation by preservation
zone landowners mandatory.31 To date the New York Plan has proved
ineffective 36 and the Chicago Plan has been a political, if not theoretical,
failure.
37
In a few instances TDR has been proposed as a complete substitute for
Euclidean lot zoning, 38 but no such programs have been enacted. The lack
of interest in TDR as a complete substitute for zoning aclowledges the
complexity of any attempt to design development rights that can be applied
to more than one type of land use. Moreover, the use of TDR as a zoning
"wipes out" that part of an affected parcel's market value reflecting anticipated physical
improvement.
31. The first mention of a technique that resembles TDR is to be found in Lloyd,
Transferable Density in Connection With Density Zoning in NEW APPROACHES TO RESIDENTIAL
LAND DEVELOPMENT 136 (Urban Land Institute Technical Bull. No. 40, 1961): "A device
capable of doing all of these things would be an instrument by which density can be transferred
from one tract to another for a monetary consideration." Id. Lloyd's suggestion is the apparent
progeny of William Whyte's proposal regarding the use of conservation easements. See W.
WHYTE, SECURING OPEN SPACE FOR URBAN AMERICA: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS (Urban Land
Institute Technical Bull. No. 36, 1959).
32. Marcus, The New York City Experience, in TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHr S 3
(Planning Advisory Service Report No. 304, 1975) [hereinafter cited as PAS].
33. See text accompanying notes 123-28 infra.
34. See text accompanying notes 133-52 infra.
35. J. CosToms, supra note 1, at 28-64; see text accompanying notes 133-41 infra.
36. See text accompanying notes 76-132 infra.
37. See note 145 infra.
38. See text accompanying notes 153-58 infra.
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substitute would require provisions for increasing the density of devel-
opment in the community as a whole after development rights are dis-
tributed, since few localities expect no growth over time.
TDR and PDR are apparently most acceptable and most easily utilized
to preserve farmland and open space and to protect sensitive environmental
areas. 39 Numerous communities, counties and states throughout the country
have TDR or variant programs aimed at open space preservation in effect
40
and in a few instances sales of development rights have been completed.4'
Numerous other state and local jurisdictions are considering TDR proposals
to preserve farmland and open space.42 It is not clear why this use of TDR is
readily accepted, though significant factors may include the present popular-
ity of open space preservation, the relative simplicity of the provisions and
the strong economic incentives provided under some plans.
This article reviews the TDR experience by analyzing legal antecedents
and analogues in this country and Great Britain, assessing existing TDR
programs and proposals, evaluating the essential role of economics and
discussing the problems presented by the relationship of TDR to the continti-
ing tension between valid police power regulation and the taking issue. The
purpose of this review is to identify the causes of success and failure in TDR
programs and to suggest modifications to present approaches that will
increase the likelihood that TDR will work. Making TDR work is no
Lilliputian task. But TDR can work if planners and lawyers are willing to
accept it as a preservation technique designed to supplement, not supplant,
existing development guidance instruments. It can work if careful planning
precedes adoption of TDR, if proponents of TDR take into account the
realities of local politics and if TDR schemes can be designed to be not only
responsive to economic determinants but also flexible enough to permit
preservation under conditions of market failure. While it is clear that ample
legal precedent exists for the use of TDR and that this planning technique
can be made to work under some conditions, there are not any ready answers
for the difficulties presented by local politics and the complexities of land
economics. All this article can do is mark the starting line.
39. See text accompanying notes 159-233 infra.
40. Id.
41. See text accompanying notes 217-33 infra.
42. See, e.g., note 216 infra.
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II. LEGAL ANTECEDENTS OF TDR
A. In the United States
1. Precedents Outside of Real Property Law
One concern registered in the TDR literature is the legality of the
technique and how it relates to possible precedents.43 While TDR is suffi-
ciently novel to spur development of specific state enabling legislation,
there are historical and contemporary legal powers and controls that suggest
that TDR is an evolutionary, not revolutionary, concept in land use regula-
tion. Professor Carmichael identifies precedents in early transportation sys-
tems development, the Milldam Acts, major drainage and irrigation pro-
jects, and gas and oil production regulations. 44 The colonies and successor
states authorized private corporations to plan, construct and maintain private
toll roads, canals and railroads. 45 The attendant authorization of private
eminent domain power established the concept that development rights
could pass from one private owner to another when justified by public
need. 46
The Milldam Acts enabled downstream owners to construct dams and
harness water power for gristmill operations so long as upstream owners
were compensated for loss of their rights to develop flooded lands.4 7 In
upholding these statutes, the courts characterized them not as invoking
eminent domain, but as police power regulations that sought to adjust
correlative riparian rights in the furtherance of the public welfare. 48 Thus, it
became unnecessary to demonstrate public use in every transfer of devel-
opment fights.
The development of drainage and irrigation systems during the
nineteenth century was effected by private enterprise under statutes that
enabled a given percentage of qualifying owners in proposed districts to
undertake projects and assess all owners in proportion to benefits received. 49
Significantly, these districts sought to develop common resources while
leaving the ownership and use of individual parcels of land in the original
owners.
43. Carmichael, Legal Precedents for Adoption of a TDR System: Colorado, in PAS,
supra note 32, at 30; Carmichael, Transferable Development Rights as a Basis for Land Use
Control, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 35 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Carmichael, TDR], excerpts
reprinted in TDR, supra note 20, at 27.
44. Carmichael, TDR, supra note 43, at 53-98.
45. See, e.g., Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. 418, 428, 1 Pick 425, 435 (1823).
46. Carmichael, TDR, supra note 43, at 53-99.
47. For a discussion of these acts, see, e.g., Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9
(1885).
48. Carmichael, TDR, supra note 43, at 64.
49. For a discussion of these statutes, see, e.g., Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. v. Clough, 242
U.S. 375 (1917).
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A sharper and more contemporary precedent is found in gas and oil
regulations that provide for pooling and unitization. Permissive and compul-
sory pooling controls the siting of wells and rate of extraction to optimize
recovery.50 Production profits are prorated, 51 thereby protecting correlative
rights but expressly demonstrating a preference for common over private
use. Unitization involves the operation of an entire oil or gas reservoir
without regard to patterns of surface ownership.52 It is often the only
feasible means of development when a single owner would not have the
economic resources to undertake complex and expensive operations such as
reinjection. The doctrinal analogy to TDR is that the development of a
common pool of gas and oil resources results in a loss of development
potential for some owners in order that the community of owners might
minimize waste. Similarly, TDR redistributes development potential to
prevent wasting the publicly valued resources of landmarks, open spaces
and farmlands.
An even closer counterpart of TDR is the conveyance of agricultural
acreage allotments from one private owner to another. 53 Under the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act of 1938, 54 annual allotments are assigned to farmers
by acreage in order to limit the production of many commodities, including
cotton, rice, peanuts and tobacco. Recently, authority has been granted
permitting the transfer of annual allotments between private parties by sale
or lease subject to the approval of the county committees of the Agricultural
Stabilization and Conservation Service. 55 As in TDR, the transfer of the
allotment shifts development potential from one parcel to another. The
landowner who conveys his allotment cannot bring his land into production
for that crop and receives in return a money payment for the right to grow
the crop from another private party.
2. Real Property Precedents
Clustering, planned unit development (PUD), special districting, sale
of air rights and transferable development credits (TDC) are close analogues
of TDR.56 Cluster subdivisions, which are typically processed as special
50. For a more complete explanation of unitization and pooling, see Carmichael, TDR,
supra note 43, at 85-89.
51. Id. at 86-87.
52. "Thus it will be seen that unitization is a conservation measure which benefits both
lessor and lessee and tends to prevent waste of a natural resource." Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Peterson, 218 F.2d 926, 933 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955).
53. SEDWAY/COOKE, supra note 24, at 24.
54. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1393 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
55. Id. § 1344(b) (Supp. V 1975); see SEDWAY/COOKE, supra note 24, at 24.
56. For a general description of these techniques, see J. BARNETT, URBAN DESIGN As
PUBLIC POLICY 30-44 (1974) (special districting); FRONTIERS OF PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT
62-74 (R. Burchell ed. 1973) (planned unit development); PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF URBAN
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exceptions under local zoning regulations, 57 concentrate a parcel's residen-
tial density in nodes or clusters. They thereby improve site design and
increase usable open space while decreasing the cost of utility services and
roadway access.
PUD is another density transfer technique. It differs from clustering in
that its provisions typically include an opportunity for a variety of housing
types and a mixture of land uses including commercial and sometimes
industrial activities. 5 Special development districts (SDDs) are similar to
PUDs though they offer greater incentives, provide increased public control
and are more often found in high density urban areas.
59
For over sixty years courts have recognized a landowner's right to sell
or lease air rights over his parcel to another party who desires to develop, or
prevent development of, the air spacer °' Like TDR, the conveyance of air
rights recognizes that a parcel's value consists of its present use value and its
development potential.
A variant of TDR called transfer of development credits (TDC) has
been added to the zoning ordinances of two New Jersey townships. 61 TDC is
akin to conventional clustering except that the "parcel" covered by the plan
need not be a contiguous unit of land.62 For example, a developer could buy
a farm at the edge of town and a parcel in the center and then apply for
permission under TDC to place the entire density on the central area parcel.
The farm, stripped of its potential for development, could then be leased
back or reconveyed in fee simple to a farmer and kept in agricultural
production.
PLANNING 478, 480 (V. Goodman ed. 1968) (clustering); Hillsborough Adopts Transfer of
Development Credits Ordinance, 2 LOCAL PLANNER, Oct. 1975, at I (transferable development
credits); Morris, "Zoning Imagination"-Dimensional Zoning, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 679
(1972); Pedowitz, Transfer of AirRights and Development Rights, 9 REAL PROP., PROB. &TR. J.
183 (1974) (sale of air rights).
57. See PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF URBAN PLANNING, supra note 56, at 480.
58. See FRONTIERS OF PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT, supra note 56, at 62. Laynen and
many planners are imprecise in their terminology. Often the term PUD is mistakenly used to
identify a strictly residential development that consists of a variety of housing types. Such
developments are more correctly called planned residential developments (PRDs) to distinguish
them from true PUDs.
59. See J. BARNETT, sypra note 56; J. COSTONIS, supra note I, at 28-30.
60. Some of the earliest air rights cases include R.M. Cobban Realty Co. v. Donlan, 51
Mont. 58, 66, 149 P. 484, 487 (1915) (upholding conveyance of growing timber and noting that
"the right of an owner to carve out of his property as many estates or interests (perpendicular
or horizontal, perpetual or limited) as it may be able to sustain cannot be open to doubt
.... "), Pearson v. Matheson, 102 S.C. 377, 86 S.E. 1063 (1915) (upholding conveyance of air
rights to the second floor area above a lot), and Taft v. Washington Mut. Savings Bank, 127
Wash. 503, 221 P. 604 (1923) (upholding conveyance by city of Seattle of air rights over an alley
to a bank). The right to condemn air rights has been established by the "airport" cases. E.g.,
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
61. Hillsborough Adopts Transfer of Development Credits Ordinance, supra note 56, at 1.
62. Id.
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Clustering, PUD, SDD, air rights and TDC are thus real property
analogues of TDR in that they are density transfer techniques designed to
improve the utilization of space and to increase flexibility in the site
planning process. They differ from TDR in two respects. None of these
other planning techniques permits the shifting of development rights from
one parcel to another between private owners and none requires the execu-
tion of an agreement to restrict future developments.
63
B. The British Experience
It is often said that a predecessor of TDR is to be found in the British
development rights experience, particularly in the Town and Country Plan-
ning Act of 194761 which nationalized development rights. A national
system for town planning was created in the first planning statute in 190965
and reflected an early recognition of the need for public intervention in the
private land market to effect a more orderly pattern of physical devel-
opment.
The 1932 Act was the first to consider the possibility of recapturing
windfall increases in land value resulting from government action. It did so
by enabling authorities either to recover up to seventy-five percent of such
increases or to offset claims for compensation by the amount of the "better-
ment"-the nonperjorative term used by the British to denote windfall
profit . 6 The provisions were little used because of their complexity.
Moreover, they led local authorities to allow financial considerations to
dominate the local land planning process.
67
The Town and Country Planning Act of 194768 was intended to over-
come the problems of the concept of betterment. It repealed all former
63. For an example of a system permitting the transfer of development rights combined
with restrictive covenants limiting the use of the land, see text accompanying notes 165-67
infra.
64. Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, 10 & I1 Geo. 6, c. 51. Much has been written
about the British experience in attempting to guide growth through the control of development
rights. See W. ASHWORTH, THE GENESIS OF MODERN BRITISH TOWN PLANNING (1954); J.
CLARKE, PLANNING LAW (1955); M. CLAWSON & P. HALL, PLANNING AND URBAN GROWTH
(1973); D. HEAP, HEAP ON THE TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING Acr, 1954 (1955); D. HEAP, THE
LAND AND THE DEVELOPMENT (1975); D. HEAP, AN OUTLINE OF PLANNING LAW (5th ed. 1973);
B. POOLEY, THE EVOLUTrION OF BRITISH PLANNING LEGISLATION (1960); Monson, The Devel-
opment and Practice of Compensation and Betterment in Present English Planning Law, 25
LAND ECON. 173 (1949); Wendt, Administrative Problems Under the British Town and Country
Planning Act of 1947, 23 LAND ECON. 427 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Wendt, Administrative
Problems]; Wendt, A Reply from England on the Effects of the British Town and Country
Planning Act, 1947, 26 LAND ECON. 397 (1950); J. Helb, The British Development Rights
Experience (1976) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with author).
65. The Housing, Town Planning, Etc. Act, 1909, 9 Edw. 7, c. 44.
66. Town and Country Planning Act, 1932, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 48.
67. D. HEAP, AN OUTLINE OF PLANNING LAW, supra note 64, at 9.
68. 10 & II Geo. 6, c. 51 (1947).
zoning laws, established a permit system for development, expanded emi-
nent domain powers based upon existing use value as the measure of
compensation and, most important, vested all development rights in the
government. 69 A landowner could file a claim for compensation for his
expropriated development rights and be paid from a £300 million fund.70
Thus, an owner who was subsequently denied permission to develop could
not claim further compensation. If planning permission was granted, the
landowner was required to pay a development charge equal to the increase in
the value of his land attributable to that permission.
7'
The 1947 Act was a partial failure, as evidenced by the near cessation
of development following its enactment72 and the subsequent repeal of the
provisions nationalizing development rights and imposing development
charges. 73 Among the causes of failure were the economic distortions
imposed by the Act (such as the passing through of increased industrial
development costs in higher end product prices) and the elimination of the
incentive to develop. 74 Complex, confusing and costly administrative proce-
dures also contributed to the demise of the 1947 Act. Moreover, the variety
of bases for determining compensation and development charges, as well as
the discretion given local authorities, politicized the process and opened the
door to unintended maldistribution of benefits and burdens.
75
The surviving features-planning control vested in approximately
ninety large units of government and a development permission system-
were the successful aspects of the Act. The lesson for American TDR should
be obvious: the British experience showed full-scale, mandatory systems to
be too costly and unmanageable. The costs and complexity of administration
are likely to be excessive, and the high levels of economic information and
understanding concerning the real estate market that are necessary to make a
full-scale, mandatory system work are either unattainable or too expensive.
In short, the total costs of such a system, including high transaction and
information costs, exceed the benefits it will produce.
69. Id. § 12.
70. Id. §§ 20, 50 sched. 4; see Wendt, Administrative Problems, supra note 64, at 428.
71. 10 & II Geo. 6, c. 51, §§ 69, 70 (1947).
72. M. CLAWSON & P. HALL, supra note 64, at 162.
73. Town and Country Planning Act, 1953, 1 & 2 Eliz. 2, c. 16.
74. Wendt, Administrative Problems, supra note 64. Also, the public found it hard to
understand and perceived the pro.visions as an indirect tax. See A. BROWN & H. SHERRARD, AN
INTRODUCTION TO TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING 370 (1969). One commentator blamed the
cessation of development under the 1947 Act on "delay, confusion and inequities." B. LEWIS,
BRITISH PLANNING AND NATIONALIZATION 158 (1952).
75. See Wendt, Administrative Problems, supra note 64, at 431-32.
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III. TDR APPLICATIONS
A. The Over-Sold Attempt To Use TDR To Preserve Landmarks
1. TDR in the "Big Apple"
The New York City experience with TDR is well documented in the
literature76 because the City Planning Commission was the first to use TDR
and because the only case law on the subject has developed from New York
City applications."7 The 1961 Zoning Resolution, 78 by changing the defini-
tion of a zoning lot, permitted density transfers between contiguous parcels
if they were within the same block and under the same ownership. 79 An
amendment in 1968 enabled a landmark owner to transfer unused density to
contiguous parcels, but restricted the increase in bulk on the receiving lots to
twenty percent over that permitted under existing zoning. The definition of
"contiguous" under the 1968 amendment was changed to include lots that
were across a street or intersection and lots that were under different
ownership.80 Subsequent amendments were apparently enacted in reaction
to problems arising from efforts to save specific landmarks. A 1969 amend-
ment redefined "adjacent" and removed the twenty percent restriction in
76. Many of the published materials on TDR have focused on the New York City
experience because that city was the first to use TDR and because the only litigation concerning
TDR has arisen from the New York City provisions. There are two collections of materials,
TDR, supra note 20 and PAS, supra note 32, that not only cover the use of TDR in preserving
landmarks but also address other applications and provide discussions of common concerns
such as legal issues, exclusionary effects and economics. The discussion that follows draws on
Baker, Development Rights Transfer and Landmarks Preservation-Providing a Sense of Orien-
tation, 9 URn. L. ANN. 131 (1975); Elliot & Marcus, From Euclid to Ramapo: New Directions in
Land Development Controls, I HOFSTRA L. REv. 56 (1973), excerpts reprinted in TDR, supra
note 20, at 157; Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York City, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
372 (1971); Marcus, The New York City Experience, in PAS, supra note 32, at 3; Theiss, The
Use of Transferable Development Rights As Compensation for Landmark Designation, 43
APPRAISAL J. 594 (1975); Note, supra note 22; Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable
Development Rights, 84 YALE L.J. 1101 (1975). The New York and Chicago experiences are
covered in PAS, supra note 32, at 3-10, and in TDR, supra note 20, at 93-164, 300-29. The New
York experience is also discussed in R. Shusterman, S. Bartlett & J. Nagle, Development
Rights Transfer Applicability to Philadelphia 5, 12 (Philadelphia City Planning Commission
Apr. 23, 1976) (unpublished, copy on file in office of North Carolina Law Review). The authors
of this piece conclude that Philadelphia could probably utilize TDR under its existing zoning,
id. at 6, and that it might try a TDR project if there was private initiative, id. at 2, but that a
TDR ordinance would be helpful, id. at 4. They recommend that there be no expenditure on
detailed studies. Id. at 15. The authors point out that a voluntary program would not work
because there are 18 million square feet of development potential available under present
zoning and that there is likely to be community opposition to denser development in the transfer
zone. Id. at 10-12.
77. See text accompanying notes 94-132 infra.
78. NEw YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION (1971), discussed in Note, supra note 22, at
344-49.
79. Id. art. I, ch. 2, § 12-10, discussed in Note, supra note 22, at 348.
80. Id. art. VII, ch. 4, § 74-79, discussed in Note, supra note 22, at 349, 351-52.
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the highest density commercial districts as a result of pending litigation. 81 In
1970, an amendment was enacted that brought public landmarks under the
TDR provisions, 82 thereby enabling transfers from the Appellate Division
Courthouse and the United States Customs House. To date, TDR has been
used in only two instances in New York City to preserve historic structures,
and approval has been granted on two other projects.83
The New York City Plan has been attacked in the literature and in the
courts. The criticisms in the literature take two forms. First, the efficacy of
the plan, its method of operation and its institutional arrangements have
been found to be faulty.8 For these problems, not fatal in themselves,
Costonis has offered the alternative of the Chicago Plan, 85 which allows the
owner of a landmark to transfer the development rights over greater dis-
tances than those permitted in the New York City Plan. The Chicago Plan
also includes a publicly held development rights bank authorized to pur-
chase those rights when they cannot be absorbed by the private market.
More strident criticism of the New York City Plan is made by authors
who argue that the basis of the plan is unconstitutional 86 or that the plan is
unnecessary, unreliable, unservicable and pernicious.8 7 The plan is said to
be unconstitutional because of the alleged inadequacy of development rights
as fair compensation for the restrictions on development that attend a
mandatory TDR program. 88 The inadequacy is thought to result, in part,
from the designation of transfer zones that are so small or overzoned that no
economic incentive exists for free market transfers of development rights. In
short, the criticism is that under the New York City Plan the development
rights have little value because few developers want or need them.
This argument, of course, only applies to a mandatory scheme without
a development rights bank. A bank would guarantee that sales of devel-
opment rights could be made. While one critic of the argument alleging
unconstitutionality has called the analysis "somewhat shallow, premature
81. Id., discussed in Note, supra note 22, at 356-57. The pending litigation concerned a
proposal to construct a building over the Grand Central Terminal waiting room. See text
accompanying notes 95-102, 117-20 infra.
82. NEw YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUIOMN art. VII, ch. 4, § 74-792 (1971), discussed in
Note, supra note 22, at 359.
83. See Woodbury, Whatever Happened to TDR?A Survey of the Status of Proposals for
Transfers of Development Rights, ENVT'L COM., Feb. 1976, at 13.
84. J. CosToNIs, supra note 1, at 54-60.
85. For further discussion of the Chicago Plan, see text accompanying notes 133-45 infra.
86. See, e.g., Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable Development Rights, supra
note 76, at 1101.
87. See, e.g., Note, supra note 22.
88. Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable Development Rights, supra note 76, at
1110-11.
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and generally. . . a minority view," 8 9 the problems raised by the constitu-
tionality argument have been the subject of judicial concern in the New
York City TDR cases.
90
The other criticism of the New York City Plan focuses on the negative
effects of increasing the density in the transfer zones.91 As noted above, the
density in the transfer zone in some areas of New York City may be
increased without restriction. 92 As the proponent of this argument con-
cludes: "[I]n the final analysis debate on the merits of development rights is
really an argument about optimal size of buildings in the central city." 
93
Though writings raising these issues of unconstitutionality and harmful
density increases discuss some major New York City TDR cases, 94 New
York appellate courts have subsequently reached decisions in the two most
important TDR cases-Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York (Grand Central) 95 and Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New
York (Tudor Parks).9 These decisions indicate that the originators of both
arguments underestimated the willingness of courts to accept TDR.
The Grand Central case arose from the 1967 Landmarks Preservation
Commission designation of Grand Central Terminal as a landmark over the
objections of the Terminal's owner. The Penn Central Railroad and a British
developer proposed to build a fifty-five story tower on the roof of the Forty-
second Street landmark, but the Landmark's Preservation Commission re-
jected the plan. In 1969, Penn Central and the developer offered another
proposal, this one for a fifty-nine story tower requiring demolition of the
Terminal's facade. When this proposal was also rejected and the city
89. SEDWAY/COOKE, supra note 24, at 14.
90. See text accompanying notes 95-132 infra.
91. See Note, supra note 22, at 370-71.
92. See text accompanying notes 79-81 supra.
93. Note, supra note 22, at 371.
94. Other than the Tudor Parks case and the Grand Central case discussed in this paper,
see text accompanying notes 95-132 infra, the New York City TDR case law includes Lutheran
Church v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 35 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1974)
(invalidating landmark designation of J.P. Morgan's former mansion owned by Lutheran
Church, apparently because designation substantially interfered with Church's charitable mis-
sion), Newport Assocs., Inc. v. Solow, 30 N.Y.2d 263, 283 N.E.2d 600, 332 N.Y.S.2d 617
(1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931, rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 977 (1973) (allowing transfer of air
rights between contiguous parcels), and Fur-Lex Realty, Inc. v. Lindsay, 81 Misc. 2d 904, 367
N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (upholding lessee's right to transfer air rights from a public
building, which it had leased, to adjoining property). For a discussion of these cases, see
Anderson, Land Use Control, 1975 Survey of N. Y. Law, 27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 167, 177 (1976);
Roberts, Property, 1975 Survey of N.Y. Law, 27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 387, 395 n.47 (1976);
Rohan, Property, 1972 Survey of N. Y. Law, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 411, 418 (1973).
95. 50 App. Div. 2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1975), affl'd, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E. 2d 1271,
397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977).
96. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976), noted in New York: Legislative
Grant of Transferable Development Rights Held to be No .ubstitute for Just Compensation, 6
REAL EST. L. REP., June 1976, at 4; Zoning. . .Owner's Property Rights, 62 A.B.A.J. 1628
(1976). See also Schnidman, New York Courts Review Transferable Development Rights, URB.
LAND, July 1976, at 22.
continued to insist on the transfer of the development rights, Penn Central
and the British developer filed suit. The trial court, which found that the
designation constituted a "taking" and granted injunctive relief, 97 was
reversed by a majority of three in the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court. This court found that the TDR provisions were constitution-
al and held that the test to be applied was whether the regulation deprived
the owners of all reasonable beneficial use of their property. Also, the court
held that plaintiff was required to prove not only that it was not actually
receiving a reasonable return, but that it was not capable of obtaining a
reasonable return. 98 More specifically, plaintiffs failed to show "that un-
used development rights over the Terminal could not have been profitably
transferred to one or more nearby sites. "99 Further, plaintiff had not shown
that the vacant or underutilized space in the Terminal could not be put to
revenue producing use.100 A lengthy dissent by two justices argued that not
only had the landmark designation so deprived Penn Central of the use of its
property that there was confiscation, but that plaintiff had established
denials of due process and equal protection of the laws. 101 Plaintiff appealed
to the New York Court of Appeals.
102
Less than five months after the Appellate Division's Grand Central
decision, the New York Court of Appeals invalidated a mandatory TDR
scheme designed to prevent development of private parkland in the Tudor
City apartment complex. 0 3 When the owners of Tudor City announced
plans to develop on their private park the city, in response to adverse public
reaction to the proposal, established a special park district and downzoned
the parcel by amendment. The owners were permitted to transfer their
development rights to a transfer zone on the East Side, but instead they
sued, claiming that the amendment was unconstitutional and seeking com-
pensation on an inverse condemnation theory. 104 The trial court declared the
1972 amendment unconstitutional and restored the original zoning. 10 5 The
Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed, holding that the city had,
97. 50 App. Div. 2d at 271, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 26-27.
98. Id. at 271, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 27-28. The court distinquished Lutheran Church v. City of
New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305,35 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1974), discussed in note 94 supra,
by implying that a more rigorous assessment of economic impact is made when there is a
charitable purpose affected. 50 App. Div. 2d at 272, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 27-28.
99. 50 App. Div. 2d at 273, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 28-29.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 275-88, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 30-42 (dissenting opinion).
102. For a discussion of the court of appeals opinion, see text accompanying notes 117-20
infra.
103. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381,
385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
104. Id. at 592, 350 N.E.2d at 383-84, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
105. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 77 Misc. 2d 199, 201, 352
N.Y.S.2d 762,765 (Sup. Ct. 1973), aff'd mem.,47 App. Div. 2d 715, 366 N.Y.S. 2d 346(1975).
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despite the severance of above-surface development rights, by
rezoning private parks exclusively as parks open to the public,
deprived the owners of the reasonable income productive or other
private use of their property. The attempted severance of the
development rights with uncertain and contingent market value did
not adequately preserve those rights.1 6
The Tudor Parks decision was truly an instance of "losing a battle but
winning a war,"'07 since the court, speaking through Chief Judge Breitel,
provided planners and lawyers with an important clarification of TDR and
the taking issue and outlined a workable structure for TDR programs. The
court corrected the belief that the invalid exercise of the police power could
be equated with a taking when it held that judicial review of zoning
regulations should be concerned only with the validity or invalidity of the
exercise of the police power."I The undoing of the Tudor Parks scheme was
that it was mandatory and failed to allocate the economic burden fairly. The
marketability of the severed development rights was "so uncertain and
contingent as to deprive the property owners of [the rights'] practical
usefulness, except under rare and perhaps coincidental circumstances." 109
By contrast, the Grand Central scheme would arguably be acceptable under
the Tudor Parks ruling, because substantial economic benefits remain under
TDR and the owners need not look solely to development rights for residual
value because underutilized space in the Terminal could be put to economic-
ally productive use.
Beyond the specific holding and the clarification of the scope of
judicial review of zoning, the court in the Tudor Parks case made several
other points providing strong support for TDR. The court noted that own-
ership of land and development rights are severable;" 0 development rights
have economic value and may be transferred to other parcels in private
ownership;' voluntary TDR programs or ones that include development
rights banks providing a ready market for development rights are not subject
to the Tudor Parks ban; 1 2 governments can and should recognize that land
values reflect interdependencies and that methods short of outright appropri-
ation may be used "to meet urgent environmental needs";113 and, most
important, "new ideas and new standards of constitutional tolerance must
106. 39 N.Y.2d at 591, 350 N.E.2d at 383, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
107. Costonis, Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York: Losing a Battle but
Winning a War, 28 LAND Use L. & ZONING DIG., Mar. 1976, at 6.
108. The taking issue is discussed at text accompanying notes 281-314 infra.
109. 39 N.Y.2d at 600, 350 N.E.2d at 389, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
110. Id. at 597, 350 N.E.2d at 387, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 598-99, 350 N.E.2d at 388, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11-12.
113. Id. at 599, 350 N.E.2d at 388, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
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and will evolve." '1 14 In short, Tudor Parks is but a side step to avoid a small,
obvious pratfall at the beginning of a long journey to develop workable TDR
programs. 115 The court limited its decision in Tudor Parks to the particular
set of facts by noting that "[i]t is enough to say that the loose-ended
transferable development rights in this case fall short of achieving a fair
allocation of economic burden."
1 16
The New York Court of Appeals unanimously upheld the New York
Supreme Court's decision in the Grand Central case in a strongly worded
opinion that the chairman of the New York City Landmarks Preservation
Commission called "the most important decision that the preservation
movemeAt has ever had.' 117 The court argued that, even with the imposed
restrictions, the railroad company could still make a reasonable return. 118 In
a remarkable discussion, the court reasoned that although the railroad was
entitled to a fair return, much of the economic value of the terminal property
was created by public actions-by providing the railroads with monopoly
power, limited rights of eminent domain and, most recently, direct sub-
sidy. 119 Moreover, the court noted that it did not matter "which comes first,
the terminal or the travelers," because the terminal and the city simulta-
neously grew, with each contributing to the economic value of the other.
120
In short, the court held that the TDR scheme was not only constitutional, but
that even if a mandatory program causes a diminution in value, a property
owner is not entitled to relief so long as the reduction is no greater than the
public's contribution to the property's value.
Thus, the prediction that the appellate courts would find the Grand
Central and Tudor Parks schemes unconstitutional because they constituted
takings without just compensation1 21 has proved incorrect. The rule to be
114. Id. at 600, 350 N.E.2d at 389, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
115. As the court stated, "[U]nfortunately, the land planners are now only at the beginning
of the path to solution." Id.
116. Id.
117. Office Tower Above Grand Central Barred, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1977, § A, at 11,
col. 1.
118. 42 N.Y.2d at-, 366 N.E.2d at 1276, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 920. The court said that the right
to use the development potential on another parcel was sufficient to meet the requirement of a
fair return. Id. at -, -, 366 N.E.2d at 1273, 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916, 922.
119. Id. at-, 366 N.E.2d at 1275-76, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918-19.
120. Id. at -, 366 N.E.2d at 1276, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
121. Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable Development Rights, supra note 76, at
1122. However, the court in the Tudor Parks case cited this Note for the proposition that an
uncertain market for development rights renders their value uncertain. 39 N.Y.2d at 598, 350
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derived from the holdings and dicta in these cases is that TDR is an
acceptable supplement to zoning, that it will not invoke consideration of the
taking issue on judicial review unless there is actual "governmental dis-
placement of private ownership,"' 2 2 and that it will be upheld unless the
landowner establishes that he is "incapable of obtaining a reasonable
return. " 
12 3
Although these recent decisions portend a happy future for TDR in
New York City, much of the TDR experience there is not relevant to other
TDR applications and should be discounted. The reactive process used to
develop the amendments affecting Grand Central and Tudor Parks is best
described as "knee-jerk" planning. This haphazard, crisis management
approach toward preserving urban amenities is bound to cause trouble. This
is especially true when the success of a TDR program depends upon its
providing a sensitive balance between the need for adequate incentives for
private transfers in the form of large, high density transfer zones and the
duty to protect landowners adjacent to those zones from unreasonable
increases in density.24 The ad hoc planning that occurred in New York is
exemplified by the 1969 amendment enacted in response to the proposed
tower over Grand Central Terminal. 125 One writer called this amendment "a
classic case of spot zoning: an amendment enacted solely for the benefit of
one landowner which was not in accordance with a comprehensive plan." 1
26
And in the Tudor Parks case, the lower court stated that "the owners'
property has been singled out" '127 and that "[t]he attempt to transfer...
[tihe. . .owners' zoning rights to the future site is either an oversight of
the . . . rights of those persons at the transfer site, or an expediential
disposition of the Tudor City controversy."12
8
N.E.2d at 388, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 12. The author of the Note made the much stronger claim that
TDR systems are, in almost all situations, unconstitutional. Note, supra at 1122. By contrast,
the Tudor Parks court held that TDR systems are constitutional, but that in the particular
application planners had failed by not ensuring that a market existed. 39 N.Y.2d at 596-99, 350
N.E.2d at 388, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
122. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d at 595, 350 N.E.2d at
386, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
123. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 50 App. Div. at 272,377 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
124. See, e.g., Costonis, Development-Rights Transfer: A Proposal for Financing Land-
marks Preservation, I REAL EsT. L.J. 163, 173 (1972).
125. See note 81 and accompanying teY supra.
126. Note, supra note 22, at 357. '
127. 77 Misc. 2d at 202, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 766.
128. Id. at 204, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 767. Since the impact on transfer zone residents may be as
great as, or greater than, the concomitant diminution in value at the preservation site, it has
been suggested that transfer zone residents be notified before their area is designated to receive
additional density. SEDWAY/COOKE, supra note 24, at 98.
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State courts have traditionally invalidated such ad hoc planning on
many grounds including the spot zoning theory,1 29 the uniformity doctrine
130
and the failure to follow a comprehensive plan. 131 In the past, the subdivi-
sion and zoning process was similarly abused by planning and zoning
commissions, which routinely changed their ordinances when confronted
with proposals that met with existing requirements but not their approval.
The "savings" provisions-'"grandfather" clauses protecting proposals
from subsequent changes in regulations-were enacted to eliminate this
misuse of the planning process.' 32 Thus, the lesson to be learned from the
New York City experience and the history of legislative and judicial intoler-
ance of reactive planning is that the misuse of otherwise acceptable devel-
opment guidance instruments will not be condoned and that carefully ar-
ticulated, anticipatory planning is critical to the success of TDR.
2. Of Professors and Politicians
133
Costonis formulated his own Chicago Plan in an effort to overcome
what he perceived to be shortcomings in the New York TDR regulations,
129. "'[S]pot' zoning . . . signifies a carving out of one or more properties located in a
given use district and reclassifying them in a different use district." Chayt v. Maryland Jockey
Club, 179 Md. 390, 393, 18 A.2d 856, 858 (1941). See also Kuehne v. Town Council, 136 Conn.
452,460, 72 A.2d 474,478 (1950); MacDonald v. Board of Comm'rs, 238 Md. 549,555,210 A.2d
325, 328 (1965).
130. "[A]II [zoning] regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of building through-
out each district." ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ZONING, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE
ZONING ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS 2
(rev. ed. 1926), quoted in J. COSTONIS, supra note 1, at 158 [hereinafter cited as A STANDARD
STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT].
131. See Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463,235 N.E.2d 897,288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968) (rezoning
of a district from business to residential held invalid because not in accordance with town's
comprehensive plan).
132. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-26a (1975). See also Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 1150 (1972).
133. The discussion in this section is drawn from numerous sources, mostly work by
Costonis, who has parlayed his embellished TDR variant, the Chicago Plan, into a substantial
list of publications. In addition to the primary source, Space Adrift, see Costonis, The Chicago
Plan: A Case Study of the Gulf Between Law and Social Change, in LAW AND THE CITY 18
(1975); Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Land-
marks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1972); Costonis, Development Rights Transfers: Description and
Perspectives for a Critique, URB. LAND, Jan. 1975, at 5; Co stonis, Development Rights Trans-
fer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973); Costonis, Development Rights Transfers
and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 12 NEWSLETTER OF BUREAU OF URB. & REGIONAL
PLAN. RESEARCH, U. ILL., URBANA, Winter 1971-72; Costonis, Environmental Protection
Through Development Rights Transfer, 14 id., Winter 1973-74; Costonis, Formula Found to
Preserve the Past, 38 PLAN. 307 (1972); Costonis, Space Adrift: A Synopsis, URn. LAND, Jan.
1975, at 16; Costonis, Whichever Way You Slice It, DRTis Here to Stay, 40 PLAN., July 1974, at
10, reprinted in TDR, supra note 20, at 57; Newsom, Critique of the Chicago Plan, in PAS,
supra note 32, at 9; Gammage, Book Review, 6 ENVT'L L. 257 (1975); Gapp, Book Review,
HIsT. PRESERVATION, Oct.-Dec. 1974, at 41. For brief summaries of the Chicago Plan, see
Costonis, The Costs of Preservation: The Chicago Plan and the Economics of Keeping Land-
marks in the Marketplace, 140 ARCHITECTURAL F., Jan.-Feb. 1974, at 61; Costonis, Do Build-
ings Have Standing?, 4 A.B.A. STUDENT LAW., Dec. 1975, at 14; Costonis, Preservation of
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including the principal weakness of inadequate incentives and the problem
of superadjacent density. 134 The Chicago Plan avoids both drawbacks by
establishing one or more transfer districts in downtown areas where land-
marks are concentrated and by allowing transfers to any land within the
entire transfer district rather than to "adjacent" lots only. 35 Density in-
creases on receiving lots are limited to fifteen percent. 13 6 Moreover, Cos-
tonis offers an independent districting alternative wherein transfer zones
would be selected from low density areas that are expected to undergo
development in the near future. 137 As the Tudor Parks amendment demon-
strates, the need for noncontiguous transfer zones is now recognized in New
York City. 13 1 This much of the Chicago Plan, therefore, is no longer novel.
Under this plan, if owners of designated landmarks cannot or will not
convey their development rights, the city can condemn the development
rights and exact a preservation restriction. 139 Costs of condemnation would
be borne by a development rights bank that could also hold or market the
rights. 140 According to the plan, the bank should be capable of sustaining
itself financially on the revenues received from the resale of development
rights. 141
The strongest feature of the Chicago Plan is the detailed economic
analysis offered to support the proposal. 142 There has, however, been some
criticism of the calculations and some indication that the results are highly
changeable over time. 143 The weakest feature of the Chicago Plan is that
Costonis and numerous others could not get it enacted in Chicago.'144 This
failure is a classic lesson in the relationship of planning and politics-the
development of a legitimating framework is essential to the political accept-
Urban Landmarks, 136 ARCHITECTURAL F., Mar. 1972, at 38; Shlaes, The Chicago Plan, in
PAS, supra note 32, at 7.
134. J. COSTONIS, supra note 1, at 55, 61.
135. Id. at 50-51, 60.
136. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: A Case Study of the Gulf Between Law and Social
Change, supra note 133, at 20.
137.- J. COSTONIS, supra note 1, at 50.
138. See text accompanying notes 103-06 supra.
139. J. COSTONIS, supra note 1, at 40.
140. Id. at 52.
141. Id. at 105-06.
142. See id. at 65-125.
143. Friedlander, Do Buildings Have Standing?, 5 A.B.A. STUDENT LAW., Sept. 1976, at 6.
Costonis admits that his data is "woefully obsolete" only three years after his work. Letter to
the editor from J. Costonis & R. DeVoy, 43 APPRAISAL J. 425 (1975) (reply to J. Shales' letter to
the editor). A summary of the original economic analysis can be found in Costonis, The Costs of
Preservation: The Chicago Plan, 42 APPRAISAL J. 402 (1974).
144. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: A Case Study of the Gulf Between Law and Social
Change, supra note 133, at 22-25.
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ance and implementation of plans and planning law. 145
The claim that TDR schemes threaten existing power relationships and
that planners and lawyers must be prepared to assume political roles has
become self-apparent. TDR failures in this country have often been the
result of political forces that discouraged efforts to surmount the status quo.
A report on the legislative development of a TDR proposal for the state of
New Jersey illustrates the difficulty of overcoming not only the skepticism
of legislators but that of their research staffs. 46 A Hillsborough, New
Jersey, developer abandoned a TDR-type proposal, which the township
planning consultant had favorably recommended, when he was delayed four
months by a governing body that could not stop tinkering with the original
ordinance. 47 The TDR efforts of Livermore, California, were stymied by a
new town attorney who simply insisted there were no such things as
development rights. t48 And the internal politics of the Suffolk County
Legislature were the apparent cause of that body's initial failure to allocate
funds to support a previously approved TDR program that promised to be
highly successful.1 49
While these examples are from TDR applications other than landmark
and urban amenity preservation, the New York City and Chicago experi-
ences, because they represent complex and intense political and economic
environments, are paradigmatic of difficulties at the extreme. It may be that
efforts to effect major changes in these dynamic social, political and
economic systems will be "counter-intuitive," that is, will result in a net
decrease in the public welfare.' 50 In New York City, TDR's failure to
145. Costonis has provided a candid discussion of why the Chicago Plan was not adopted.
Costonis, The Chicago Plan: A Case Study of the Gulf Between Law and Social Change, supra
note 133. He concludes that several factors support or hinder the adoption of plans such as his.
Among those are the support of affected government actors, the support or at least acquies-
cence of the populace generally, the novelty of the concept, the complexity of the proposal, the
extent to which the concept threatens the status quo and the degree to which other societal
developments are enhanced or frustrated by the concept. Id. at 28-29. See also Chicago Plan
Ruled Out in Chicago, 40 PLAN., July 1974, at 8; Friedlander, supra note 143. On the more
general problem of the relationship of planning and politics, see A. CATANESE, PLANNERS AND
LOCAL POLITICS (1974); F. RABINOWITZ, CITY POLITICS AND PLANNING (1970).
146. J. Helm & J. Reifer, The Legislative Development and Consideration of the New
Jersey T.D.R. Proposal (1975) (unpublished, New Jersey Legislative Service Agency) (copy on
file in office of North Carolina Law Review).
147. Letter to the author from Thomas Peterson, Planning Administrator, Hilisborough,
N.J. (Feb. 23, 1977) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law Review).
148. Letter to the author from George R. Musso, Director of Planning, Livermore, Cal.
(Nov. 2, 1976) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law Review).
149. Gupte, The Fight That Everyone Lost, N.Y.Times, May 16, 1976, § 21, at 6, col. 7.
150. Jay Forrester in his book Urban Dynamics uses the term "counter-intuitive" to
describe the following problem:
With a high degree of confidence we can say that the intuitive solutions to the
problems of complex social systems will be wrong most of the time. Here lies much of
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comprehend economic determinants resulted in the Tudor Parks defeat. "I In
Chicago, the inability to intervene in the existing political system to effect
constructive change perhaps reflected the correct perceptions of key actors
who saw a net loss in disrupting existing relationships.152 In sum, the ability
of TDR to preserve urban amenities in large cities has been both oversold
and incompletely tested. Planners and lawyers should not be dissuaded by
the New York City and Chicago experiences, but instead should infer from
them that more modest applications of TDR in environments of lesser
economic and political complexity may be more successful.
B. TDR as a Complete Substitute for Zoning
Before turning to a discussion of what may be the best use of TDR-
the preservation of open space-an overview of TDR as a complete substi-
tute for zoning is warranted. 153 To effect such a program a community
would adopt a land use plan and stipulate the number of development rights
that would be required for approval of development requests. '54 Residential
development rights would be defined in terms of dwelling units while
commercial and industrial development rights would be defined in terms of
square footage. Development rights of all types would be distributed to land
owners in proportion to the number of acres they owned. Through private
transfers, developers could buy and sell rights until they had the combina-
tion necessary to gain approval of their development plans. Any change in
density of land use or adjustment in the amounts of land dedicated to
different uses within the community would require revision of the total plan
and a new distribution of development rights. 15
5
the explanation for the problems of faltering companies, disappointments in devel-
oping nations, foreign-exchange crises, and troubles of urban areas.
J. FORRESTER, URBAN DYNAMICS 110 (1969). To his list might be added the difficulties in making
TDR work in New York City and Chicago.
151. But it may be unfair to lay the blame on reactive planning. If Forrester is correct, see
id., the economics of TDR in New York City may be unknowable or, at least, the information
costs may greatly exceed potential derived benefits.
152. See note 145 supra.
153. The principal proponent of using TDR to effect "a total reform in the system of
regulating land use" is Audrey Moore, a member of the Fairfax County, Virginia, Board of
Supervisors. Moore, TDR's as the Solution to Failings of Existing Land-Use Controls: Fairfax
County, Virginia, in PAS, supra note 32, at 27. See also W. GOODMAN, DESCRIPrTVE INFORMA-
TION ON TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS (1970), excerpts reprinted in TDR, supra note 20,
at 210; Schnidman, Transferable Development Rights: An Idea In Search of Implementation, 1
LAND & WATER L. REV. 339, 350-51 (1976); A. Moore, Transferable Development Rights: An
Idea Whose Time Has Come (1974) (mimeograph, Fairfax County, Va.), excerpts reprinted in
TDR, supra note 20, at 221.
154. Moore, TDR's as the Solution to Failings of Existing Land-Use Controls: Fairfax
County, Virginia, supra note 153, at 27.
155. Id.
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An alternative proposal would have all development rights inthe same
unit of measure. 56 Its proponents do not specify the unit that would be used,
but their example is based on acreage. They recognize some problems with
this use of TDR, 157 but fail to identffy two critical difficulties. The assign-
ment of one measure of development rights to residential uses and another to
commercial and industrial uses causes the market to become highly frag-
mented and impedes transfers. While a need exists to maintain some con-
straint on the ultimate mix of land uses, it may be desirable to forego some
residential development in favor of commercial and industrial construction
or vice versa. 158 To prohibit such adjustments is to lose an advantage of
flexibility. Even if the units of measure are the same for all uses, however,
the best measure for residential uses may not be the best for others. While
acreage measures and dwelling units per acre might be acceptable for
residential uses, they are poor measures of commercial and industrial im-
pacts. Conversely, square footage may work for business uses, but make
little sense for housing development.
Second, in' using TDR as a complete substitute for zoning, every
substantial change to any part of the land use plan will require a readjust-
ment in the allocation of development rights issued to every landowner in
the town. This need for reallocation results from the fact that every land-
owner is given an initial pro rata share of the total development rights of all
types available for the community. If residential density is to be increased
by ten percent, for example, additional development rights would have to be
issued. Similarly, a decision to decrease commercial density would necessi-
tate the surrender of development rights. In the typical growth situation,
reallocations will most likely be by issuance of fractional development
rights. But the high costs involved in these constant reallocations are likely
to make "complete substitute" TDR unworkable in most localities. In
short, TDR is best used as a supplement to, not a substitute for, other
development guidance instruments.
C. Preserving Environmentally Sensitive Areas, Farmland
and Open Space
The use of TDR to preserve environmentally sensitive areas, farmland
and open space has the most promise for developing workable TDR pro-
156. Foster, Schnidman & Bailey, Transferable Development Rights: Are They a Step in the
Direction of Better Land Use Management?, 34 URB. LAND, Jan. 1975, at 28.
157. Id. at 34.
158. The interest in such flexibility is apparent in the increasing popularity of mixed use
developments. MIXED USE DEVELOPMENTS: NEW WAYS OF LAND USE (Urban Land Institute
Technical Bull. No. 71, 1976).
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grams. Present proposals and existing applications represent supplemental
uses of TDR, are limited in their objectives and appear to have been best
received when participation is voluntary. The economics of TDR-the
valuation and allocation of development rights and the creation and mainte-
nance of effective markets--continues to raise yet unanswered questions.
1. Safeguarding Critical Environmental Areas
One proposed and one present use of TDR are directly related to the
preservation of environmentally sensitive areas, particularly wetlands. The
proposed Puerto Rico Plan was developed by Costonis with the assistance of
Robert S. DeVoy of the Real Estate Research Corporation under the spon-
sorship of The Conservation Trust of Puerto Rico.15 9 Designed to protect
unique ecological resources, the Plan has four steps. First, planners would
inventory sensitive areas. 160 Second, the planning board would designate
these areas as Protected Environmental Zones (PEZs) and apply restrictive
regulations. 161 Third, property owners who were refused development per-
mission could have administrative review by an appeals board which, if it
felt the regulations prevented a reasonable return on the land, might grant
relief in the form of a variance, compensation up to "reasonable beneficial
use," or some other negotiated settlement. 162 Fourth, acquisition and other
costs would be funded primarily by resale of the development rights to
owners of property in designated transfer districts located in developing
areas capable of carrying greater densities. 163 The Plan has not yet been
afforded serious consideration because of the recent reorganization of land
planning activities in Puerto Rico.1
64
Collier County, Florida, in July 1974, enacted a TDR provision intend-
ed to protect the semitropical swamp that covers most of its largely unde-
veloped land.' 65 Eighty-four percent of the land was designated as a Special
Treatment (ST) zone in which landowners were required to receive special
159. J. COSTONIS & R. DEVOY, THE PUERTO Rico PLAN (1974), excerpts reprinted in TDR,
supra note 20, at 200; DeVoy, The Puerto Rico Proposal: Preserving the Environment, in
PAS, supra note 32, at 13.




164. Woodbury, supra note 83, at 16.
165. Collier County, Fla., Zoning Ordinance 76-43 (Sept. 31, 1976). For background, see
Collier County, Fla., Studies Recommendation for TDR to Limit Development in Selected
Areas, 2 LAND USE PLAN. REP., Aug. 12, 1974, at 7; Spagna, Can 'ST'Save Collier's Unspoiled
Lands?, FLA. ENVT'L. & URB. IssuEs, May/June 1975, at 4; State and Local Briefs, 2 LAND
USE PLAN. REP., Oct. 14, 1974, at 4, 6. See also Schnidman, supra note 153, at 359-61.
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permits before developing. Instead of developing, the landowner in an ST
zone could transfer density to a contiguous zone not designated ST and file a
restrictive covenant in the land records limiting use of the ST land.' 66
Because of economic conditions, no transfers have occurred. Two legal
actions challenging ST designation are pending, however.
167
2. Preserving Farmland and Open Space
As noted at the beginning of this article, there has been an increasing
conversion of farmland and open space in recent years. Dramatic examples
are numerous. Polk County, Florida, is the state's leading citrus county and
the sixth largest citrus producer in the world with production almost equal to
California's total output. 168 The last biennial survey revealed that citrus
acreage had dropped 10,000 acres and that if present growth patterns
continued, fully forty percent of the citrus acreage would be taken out of
production.169 In Maryland, farm acreage had dropped from 4.2 million
acres (sixty-seven percent) in 1945 to 2.8 million acres (forty-four percent)
in 1969 with only 1.0 to 1.3 million acres (sixteen to twenty'percent)
expected to remain in 2000.170
a. The Inefficacy of Police Power Regulation and Differential Taxation
Planners have attempted to understand the complex process of land
conversion, but their efforts have not produced clear answers as to the most
effective strategies of intervention.1 71 While many techniques have been
166. Collier County, Fla., Zoning Ordinance 76-43 (Sept. 31, 1976).
167. Woodbury, supra note 83, at 14.
168. BUREAU OF COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING, supra note 2, at 16.
169. Id. at 16.
170. COMMITTEE ON THE PRESERVATION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND, supra note 2, at 15.
171. See, e.g., M. CLAWSON, supra note 2; R. SNYDER, AGRICULTURAL LAND USE POLICY:
SOME PERSPECTIVES AND OBSERVATIONS (Agricultural Extension Service, University of Minn.,
1976); Kaiser & Weiss, Public Policy and the Residential Development Process, 36 J. AMER.
INST. OF PLANNERS 30 (1970).
In 1960 it was felt that: "In agriculture, it now appears that the agricultural surplus is
almost a permanent feature of the American economic scene." M. CLAWSON, R. HEID & C.
STODDARD, LAND FOR THE FUTURE 274 (1960). But by 1976 average farmland prices were
$1009/acre in Iowa, up 138% since 1970 with some sales at $3000/acre. Pilner, Farmland Price
Spiral Places a Squeeze on Returns from Farm and Ranch Investments-But Appreciation
Continues, 45 APPRAISAL J. 80 (1977). The reason, according to Pilner, is that exports and
productivity have increased. Id. at 81. In considering the need for agricultural land, one must
differentiate by crop and by location. Nationally, only 365 million acres out of 631 million acres
of land suitable for continuous cultivation were in use in 1967, indicating a substantial reserve
capacity. R. SNYDER, supra at 13. The problem at the local level and- for some crops, for
example, Florida's citrus, is the reduction in efficiency that results from conversion of agricul-
tural resources that are expensive to bring into production on new sites. In 1955-1956 the net
agricultural output of land scheduled for conversion to urban uses in England and Wales was
more than 50% greater than the average for all farms. J. WIBBERLY, AGRICULTURAL AND URBAN
GROWTH: A STUDY OF THE COMPETITION FOR RURAL LAND 63 (1959). Wibberly proposes that a
benefit-cost analysis be used in deciding whether to allow conversion of farmland. Id.
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recognized, 172 only two-police power regulation (for example, zoning,
subdivision codes and environmental standards) and differential tax assess-
ment-are commonly used. Large lot zoning has sometimes slowed conver-
sion173 but is often contested, 174 especially when it reaches extremes.
175
Judicial approval has been given to regulations that severely restrict or
completely prohibit development in critical environmental areas such as
floodplains and wetlands. 176 The rationales used to support restrictions in
critical environmental areas include the protection of public safety, the
prevention of nuisance and the promotion of aesthetics. 177 The application
of these rationales as bases for judicial imprimatur of restrictive regulations
on less sensitive farmland and open space is less tenable.
Differential tax treatment 17 for farm or other types of land exists in
forty-two states 179 and four of the remaining eight states180 have classified
property systems that include some tax preference."'8 Fourteen states have
pure preferential assessment in which the land is taxed on its present use
value. 182 Deferred taxation programs in twenty-five states also produce an
abatement, but include a "rollback" or recovery of all or part of the taxes
saved if the land is converted, usually within a stated period of between two
and fifteen years.1 83 Restrictive agreement programs are in effect in five
A recent article summarizing a preliminary report of the 1974 Census of Agriculture noted
that even in Connecticut, where the principal agricultural products by gross sales are milk, eggs
and tobacco, value of farmland almost doubled in five years to $1746/acre in 1974 from
$964/acre in 1969. In the same period farm acreage dropped from 423,000 to 377,000 acres.
Faber, Farm Area Down, LandPrices Up, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1977, Conn. sec., at 10, col. 5.
172. Over 25 techniques are listed in Engel, Political and Economic Approaches to Retain-
ing Prime Land, 48 STATE GOV'T 210, 213 (1975).
173. See W. BRYANT, FARMLAND PRESERVATION ALTERNATIVES IN SEMI-SUBURBAN AREAS
(Cornell University Dep't of Agricultural Economics, 1975); California Is Going to Protect Its
Coastline, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1976, at 4, col. 6; Kusler, Open Space Zoning: Valid Regula-
tion or Invalid Taking, 57 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1972).
Sometimes merely slowing conversion with low density zoning can be the impetus for long-
run preservation. It is claimed that 20 acre zoning thus saved the Napa Valley orchards. LAND
USE, OPEN SPACE AND THE GOVERNMENT PROCESS: THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY EXPERIENCE 45 (E.
Smith & D. Riggs eds. 1974).
174. See Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972); National
Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Board of County Supervisors v.
Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
175. An extreme example of large lot zoning is to be found in the Adirondack Park
Agency's requirement of up to 42.7 acres per building. Savage & Sierchio, supra note 9, at 456-
57.
176. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), is now the classic
example of judicial approval of such restrictive regulations.
177. See id. at 15-16, 201 N.W.2d at 767.
178. The discussion that follows is based on UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 17.
179. Id. at 13.
180. Alabama, Louisiana, Tennessee and West Virginia. Id.
181. Id. at 12, 19.
182. Id. at 19, 31-39.
183. Id. at 19, 39-42.
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states 184 and are distinguished from types of differential assessment pro-
grams by the fact that under a restrictive agreement program, the landowner
is reasonably certain that he will be unable to develop his land during a set
period.1 5 Under these laws, an eligible landowner may enter into a contract
with the state or local jurisdiction by which he agrees to maintain his land in
eligible uses for some period. 186 In return, the landowner receives a prefer-
ential assessment and lower taxes, but he may be required to pay a
cancellation fee if he breaches the contract by converting the land to an
ineligible use.'87 Under the Williamson Act, 88 a California law that is
typical of restrictive agreement programs, there is a ten year "runout
period" that begins in the first year after the landowner notifies local
authorities that he does not desire automatic renewal.189 During this "runout
period" assessments increase to market value.' 90 If a landowner is granted a
special exception to develop an ineligible use on the property before the end
of the runout period, he must pay a penalty of 12.5 percent of the property's
fair market value.
191
Participation in these programs is moderate. In California in 1975,
thirty percent of privately owned nonurban land was subject to the William-
son Act restriction.192 Under Washington's new differential assessment law,
9.5 percent of the agricultural land was classified in 1975,193 and twenty-
three percent of Connecticut's total land area was differentially assessed in
1963.' 94 The Council on Environmental Quality, in a recent report, cata-
logued and analyzed the effect of differential tax programs. The findings are
discouraging:
[E]xcept in certain circumstances, we conclude that differential
assessment is not very effective in maintaining current use in urban
areas, even in the short run. In the long run, death and retirement
will bring almost all properties on the open market, and, as a rule,
the demand for land for urban uses will increase. In this longer run
perspective, differential assessment is of little significance in main-
taining farm or other open uses.' 95
184. Id. at 19, 42-43.
185. Id. at 43.
186. See, e.g., id. at 42-43.
187. Id. at 43.
188. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51200-51295 (West 1966 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
189. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 17, at 42-43, 279.
190. Id. at 43, 279-84.
191. Id. at 43, 284.
192. Id. at 271.
193. Id. at 236.
194. CONNECTICUT DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, AN EVALUTION OF PUBLIC ACT
490, at 6 (1976).
195. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 17, at 116.
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Furthermore, we find that even if the marginal effectiveness
of differential assessment were considered to be sufficient as a
short-term holding action, its expense in tax expenditures is so high
as to render it an inefficient means for achieving such retardation
of land conversion as it does.'9
Thus, differential tax schemes fail to provide a lasting solution and are
economically inefficient. 197
b. State TDR Programs
The greatest state-level activity in TDR is found in New Jersey.198 In
July 1976, the state Assembly approved a five million dollar "Agricultural
196. Id. at 118.
197. The conclusions in UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 17, have been reached else-
where. Even in the decidedly "promotional" report on Connecticut's preferential assessment
program, the Department of Environmental Protection recognized that the technique is only "a
limited range tool in buying years of time to study the problems of growth and to develop ways
of accommodating orderly development .... " CONNECTICUT DEP'T OF ENVT'L PROTECTION,
supra note 194, at 40; see Gustafson & Wallace, Differential Assessment as Land Use Policy:
The California Case, 41 J. AMER. INST. OF PLANNERS 379 (1975) (finding that the Williamson
Act is ineffective as a growth guidance technique). See also Letter to the editor from R.
Josephy of Bethel, Connecticut, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1976, at 28, col. 5 (expressing opinion that
Connecticut's 14 year old tax abatement program has only slowed, not stopped the loss of
farms).
One problem, not adequately addressed in the literature, is the "hidden" tax shifts that
occur as a result of preferential assessment. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 17, at 160-61,
reports, for example, that tax shifts in 151 New Jersey municipalities resulted in an increase of
30% or more in the tax rates in 38 municipalities with all but 48 experiencing at least a 10%6
increase.
The only attempt to measure the economic efficiency of preservational alternatives is
reported in LAND USE, OPEN SPACE AND THE GOVERNMENT PROCESS: THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY
EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 32-33. The only techniques showing a benefit-cost ratio in
excess of unity are near term acquisition plus zoning (1.08: 1) and acquisition plus zoning with
compensation (1.5:1). This latter alternative is the basic structure for TDR and PDR. Id.
198. A group connected with Rutgers University has written extensively on TDR in general
and on the New Jersey efforts in particular. See B. CHAVOOSHIAN, T. NORMAN & G. NIESWAND,
TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS: A NEW CONCEPT IN LAND USE MANAGEMENT (Rutgers
University Cooperative Extension Service Leaflet No. 492-A, 1974) (reprinting earlier version,
Chavooshian & Norman, Transfer of Development Rights: A New Concept in Land Use
Management, 32 URB. LAND, Dec. 1973, at 11); Chavooshian, Nieswand & Norman, Growth
Management Program: A New Planning Approach, 34 URB. LAND, Jan. 1975, at 22.
An interesting TDR game modelled on other simulation activities such as SIMSOC and
CLUG is G. NIESWAND, J. AINOLA & B. CHAVOOSHIAN, THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT
RIGHTS GAME (Cook College Rutgers, Leaflet No. 507, 1974). This group has also produced the
definitive bibliography on TDR. J. HELB, B. CHAVOOSHIAN & G. NIESWAND, DEVELOPMENT
RIGHTS BIBLIOGRAPHY (Cook College Rutgers, Leaflet No. 533, 1976). This bibliography served
as the basis of another, more current bibliography. D. MERRIAM & A. MERRIAM, A BIBLIOGRA-
PHY ON THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS (Council of Planning Librarians Exchange
Bibliography No. 1338, 1977). A shorter, but useful bibliography has been published by another
author. Schnidman, Transfer of Development Rights: Questions and Bibliography, 34 URB.
LAND, Jan. 1975, at 10; Schnidman, Transfer of Development Rights-An Update, 34 URB.
LAND, May 1975, at 14. Another somewhat out-of-date bibliography is available. H. BURNS,
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFER: INTRODUCTION AND BIBLIOGRAPHY (Council of Planning Li-
brarians Exchange Bibliography No. 755, 1975). Of some utility is P. LOWENBERG, WINDFALLS
(Vol. 56
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Preserve Demonstration Project" which allowed the state to purchase devel-
opment rights from Burlington County farm owners who submit offers of
sale.' 99 While the available literature contains no clear statement regarding
the expected cost per acre for the development rights, one unpublished New
Jersey Department of Agriculture information sheet notes that a maximum
of 10,000 acres could be preserved by the project.2 °0 If the Department is
saying that it expects to buy development rights from 10,000 acres with the
$5 million allocation (that is $500 per acre), it has probably underestimated
actual costs.
A Connecticut PDR statute was proposed during the 1976 session but.
not enacted. 201 The proposal considered but not enacted by the 1977 sessi6in
was also a PDR program and would have cost an estimated $500 million. 2 2
FOR WIPEOUTS: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON BETTERMENT RECAPTURE AND WORSENMENT
AVOIDANCE TECHNIQUES IN THE UNITED STATES, AUSTRALIA, CANADA, ENGLAND AND NEW
ZEALAND 129-42 (Council of Planning Librarians Exchange Bibliography Nos. 618, 619, 620,
1974).
199. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:1B-1 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); Letter to author from John Helb,
N.J. Legislative Research Associate (Sept. 13, 1976) (copy on file in office of North Carolina
Law Review); see Public Hearing Before Assembly Agriculture and Environment Committee on
Assembly No. 1334, 197th N.J. Legis., 1st Annual Sess. (Feb. 23, 1976, March 1, 1976); New
Jersey Plans Farmland Preservation Program, 4 LAND USE PLAN. REP., June 21, 1976, at 6; New
Jersey Sets Up Project for Farmland Preservation, 42 PLAN., Aug. 1976, at 7; Willis, The New
Jersey Proposal. Preserving Essential Open Space, in PAS, supra note 32, at 11.
In 1976 a TDR bill, as distinguished from the PDR experiment discussed above, was passed
by the Assembly, but defeated by the Senate. That bill is being reconsidered in 1977. Helb &
Reifer, New Jersey General Assembly Has Passed Enabling Legislation For Use of TDR, 10
AM. INST. OF PLANNERS NEWSLETTER, Oct. 1975, at 11; New Jersey General Assembly Passes
TDR Bill, 3 LAND USE PLAN. REP., May 12, 1975, at 7; TDR Bill in New Jersey Will Be Back
Again, 6 PRAC. PLANNER, Feb. 1976, at 45. For background on that proposal, see I & 2 Public
Hearing Before the Assembly Municipal Government Committee on Assembly No. 3192, 196th
N.J. Legis., 2d Annual Sess. (Mar. 12, 1975, Mar. 19, 1975). Maryland has also considered PDR
legislation. Brief Study of TDR Published by University of Maryland Service, 2 LAND USE PLAN.
REP., Nov. 4, 1974, at 4; Maryland Legislature to Consider Agricultural Lands Bill, 3 LAND
USE PLAN. REP., Dec. 22, 1975, at 4; Rose, Proposed Development Rights Legislation Can
Change the Name of the Land Investment Game, I REAL EST. L.J. 276 (1973).
200. NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, FARMLAND PRESERVATION DEMONSTRATION PRO-
JECT QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, answer no. 1 (March 1976). For additional information on how
the PDR experiment is to be conducted, see NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, FARMLAND
PRESERVATION (n.d.); NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, GUIDELINES FOR LANDOWNERS
(May, 1976); NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, GUIDELINES FOR RULES AND REGULATIONS
(n.d.); NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, INFORMATION ON THE AGRICULTURE PRESERVE
(March 22, 1976). See also Press release, Office of the New Jersey Governor (July 22, 1976)
(announcing signing of "Agriculture Preserve Demonstration Project") (copy on file in office
of North Carolina Law Review).
201. Raised Committee Bills 406, 531, Conn. Legis., 1976 Sess. (1976). Most of the
opposition came from the Connecticut Association of Realtors which argued that the financing
provisions ($500 million to be raised by a 1% tax on all real estate transfers) were inflationary
and a deterrent to development. Letter to members of Finance and Environment Committees
from Connecticut Association of Realtors (Mar. 4, 1976) (copy on file in office of North
Carolina Law Review). See also TDR Considered in Connecticut, 27 LAND USE L. & ZONING
DIG., Oct. 1975, at 6.
202. Facing Farm Preservation Issues, New Haven Register, Aug. 24, 1977, at 18, col. I;
Time for a Farmlands Decision, New Haven Register, Mar. 18, 1977, at 10, col. I.
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A survey of Connecticut farm owners has indicated that thirty-four percent
are willing to sell development rights within five years, eight percent after
five years, ten percent maybe, twenty-one percent never, three percent had
sold their land or it belonged to the state, and twenty-four percent did not
reply.2 3
The New York State Assembly Subcommittee on Town and Village
Government held hearings in the fall of 1976 on proposed TDR enabling
legislation.2 04 The proposed act2 5 is the briefest and most general enabling
provision considered in any state. It simply declares that local use of TDR
would promote the public welfare as part of a land management program.
20 6
Development rights may be calculated in any effective manner. 207 General
criteria for designating preservation and transfer districts are listed and the
density in the transfer district is limited to "overall maximum permissible
density for the district," 20 8 implying the need for moderate downzoning to
provide the incentive for private transfers. Local planning boards would
administer the program, review TDR applications, conduct a public hearing
on each application and, when approving a request, make a specific finding




Comments at the hearings were generally supportive, but some critics
complained that the bill was not specific enough210 and that local com-
munities should be given a more detailed guide for valuing development
rights and designating preservation and transfer districts. 211 With TDR in its
infancy, however, the New York approach to enabling legislation seems
ideal, since it minimizes constraint and enhances innovation. If the devel-
opment of law is evolutionary, then the correct beginning is from a permis-
203. P. WAGGONER, D. TUTTLE & D. HILL, LAND FOR GROWING FOOD IN CONNECTICUT 8
(Conn. Agricultural Experiment Station Bull. No. 769, 1977). The authors estimate that devel-
opment rights will cost $1800 per acre. Id. There is considerable interest in the proposal and
media support for it. See Basis for Farmlands Decision, New Haven Register, Feb. 17, 1977, at
10, col. I; Begin Farmland Buys Now, New Haven Journal-Courier, Feb. 15, 1977, at 4, col. 1;
Legislature's Lone Farmer Cultivates Land-Saving Bill, New Haven Reigster, Feb. 14, 1977, at
13, col. 2.
204. Proposed Transfer of Development Rights Act: Hearings of Assembly Subcommittee
on Town and Village Government on Transfer of Development Rights-Assembly Bill 9374,
1976 Sess. (Sept. 29, 1976, Hauppage, N.Y., Oct. 6, 1976, Kingston, N.Y.).
205. New York Assem. Bill 9374, 1975-76 Sess. (Jan. 22, 1976) (copy on file in office of
North Carolina Law Review).
206. Id.
207. Id. § 2.
208. Id. § 2(i).
209. Id. § 2(b).
210. Proposed Transfer of Development Rights Act: Hearings of Assembly Subcommittee
on Town and Village Government on Transfer of Development Rights-Assembly Bill 9314,
supra note 204 (comments submitted by Dr. Newton, Cooperative Extension Agent, Cornell
University).
211. Id. (Testimony by Upstate Chapter of the American Institute of Planners).
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sive statutory foundation. Detailed and restrictive enabling provisions would
lock communities into existing TDR forms and hamstring efforts to create
new variants and procedures.
Whether state enabling legislation is necessary for TDR is still an open
question. The existence of successful TDR and PDR programs at the local
level in states that have no TDR enabling legislation indicates that localities
in some states may not need specific authority. 12 To get a more accurate
view of the perceived need for enabling legislation, as well as to gather other
information regarding TDR activity and farmland preservation, question-
naires were sent to the legislative commissions or their equivalent in all
states, Puerto Rico and American Samoa.
The thirty-three responses to these questionnaires showed no clear
pattern. In twelve jurisdictions it was felt that TDR was not authorized under
the existing enabling statutes and that new legislation would be necessary.
Coincidentally, or perhaps consequently, there are no reports in the litera-
ture or in these twelve responses of any TDR provisions in effect in these
states. The need for TDR enabling legislation was specifically denied by
officials in five states. Legislative commissioners in sixteen states would not
commit themselves to a clear position on the need for enabling legislation,
but responded only that no TDR procedures were presently in effect. Replies
from two states indicated that regulations prohibited answering research
inquiries from sources other than state legislators. Responses were not
received from seventeen jurisdictions, even though second requests were
sent.2 13
212. The local zoning power comes only from state enabling legislation since zoning is an
exercise of the police power. All states allow municipalities to zone. For a survey of the
enabling laws, see Cunningham, Land Use Control-the State and Local Programs, 50 IOWA L.
REV. 367 (1965).
While most enabling acts are based on the 50 year old A STANDARD STATE ZONING
ENABLING ACT, supra note 130, the acts vary due to numerous amendments. There are two
aspects of the need for specific enabling legislation. The first is whether TDR is a proper police
power-that is, does it promote the "health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the
community." Id. § 1; see J. COSTONIS, supra note 1, at 165-66. If there is a question as to
whether TDR programs are valid exercises of the police power enabled under existing statutes,
then specific authority may be necessary. The second problem is that development rights are
new-there is little case law and most of it is useful only by analogy. If stable markets for
development rights are to be created, then statutory law may be required to define the legal
rights of those dealing in development rights. As a researcher from the Legislative Reference
Bureau for the State of Hawaii has noted: "In view of the economic status of a TDR system
participant, some clarification of related state law would probably be necessary before success-
ful county programs could be instituted." Letter to author from M. McElroy (May 24, 1977)
(copy on file in office of North Carolina Law Review).
213. Enabling legislation necessary: Georgia (opinion of Attorney General that conserva-
tion easements are valid); Hawaii; Idaho; Indiana ("there is great reluctance to allow govern-
ment to have any more control than it already does"); Iowa; Kentucky (Kentucky Nature
Reserves Act, KY. REV. STAT. § 146.465 (Supp. 1976), allows purchase of less than fee
1978] TDR
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It is noteworthy that officials in so many states failed to give a direct
answer to the clearly stated question, "If the statutes do not specifically
provide for TDR, could present provisions be reasonably interpreted to
allow such transfers?" There may be a general reluctance to give legal
opinions or legislative commissioners may be unable to assess the propriety
of TDR under present enabling legislation. Some commentators recognize
the need for a statutory foundation,2" 4 and it is noteworthy that Costonis
worked to get state enabling legislation enacted in his campaign to have the
Chicago Plan adopted.215 Though enabling legislation may not be necessary
for some TDR schemes in some states, a statutory basis would permit
recognition of TDR as a valid exercise of the police power, provide an
opportunity to specify an institutional framework for regulating transfers
and allow states to impose requirements for the effective land planning that
is essential to designating preservation and transfer zones. Finally, of
course, when states desire to fund PDR programs, legislation will be
required.
interests); New Mexico ("We have more open space out here than anything else."); Ohio;
Oklahoma; Oregon (enabling bill recently defeated); Rhode Island; Utah.
Enabling legislation not needed: Alabama (PDR is probably allowed, but TDR is open to
question); Arizona; Colorado (statutes "arguably allow this use"); Tennessee (Agricultural,
Forest and Open Space Land Act of 1976, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-650 to -658 (1976));
Washington.
No procedure presently exists: Arkansas; Connecticut; Delaware ("Frankly, the Transfer
of Development Rights is new to us."); Kansas; Louisiana; Maine; Michigan; Mississippi;
Montana ("TDR's are regarded by many in Montana as a subversive plot .... "); Nevada;
North Carolina; North Dakota; Pennsylvania (32 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5005 (Purdon Cum.
Supp. 1977) allows purchase of less than fee interests and later resale subject to restrictive
covenants or easements); Vermont; Virginia; West Virginia.
American Samoa's response was: "I am sorry, we do not have any TDR legislation or
anything similar to it as 96% of our land is communally held and there are other restrictions
upon its alienation and use."
Cannot service request: California; South Dakota.
Copies of all letters are on file in the office of North Carolina Law Review. Some
commentators believe enabling legislation is essential for a successful program. Hicks, Transfer
of Development Rights, 4 STATE PLAN. ISSUES: 1974, at 9 (1974).
Some replies to the questionnaires showed apparent indifference to TDR, ignorance of the
concept or misunderstanding of relevant state statutes. Many legislative commissioners, how-
ever, indicated interest in TDR by identifying uses of TDR at the local level and by requesting
that the author supply additional information. Indifference: New Mexico; lack of knowledge:
Delaware; misunderstanding: Letter to author from D. Ed, Administrator in the Office of
Illinois Secretary of State (Jan. 17, 1977), which states, in part: "I know of no specific
Illinois law regarding transfer of development rights." However, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §§ I I-
48.2-lA to 11.48.2-2 (Cum. Supp. 1977), allows for TDR in landmark preservation and was
enacted in order to further the Chicago Plan; see Friedlander, supra note 143, at 6.
214. See, e.g., Bellandi & Hennigan, The Why and How of Transferable Development
Rights, 7 REAL EST. REV., Summer, 1974, at 60, 63-64.
215. See J. COSTONIS, supra note 1, at 182-93.
c. Local TDR Programs
Some indication that TDR can work is to be found in the several local
programs and proposals that seek to preserve farmland and open space and
are designed to supplement existing land use controls.216 Two programs,
216. There are many interesting TDR and PDR programs that are operational or proposed.
In Matansuka-Susitna Borough, Alaska, public authorities have been conveying ownership of
public land to potential farmers subject to a restriction that limits use of the land to agricultural
purposes. This program suggests a useful method of selling no longer needed public watersheds
and park lands while protecting the land and gaining funds and property tax revenues that can
be used to purchase the development rights in other property requiring protection. See Matan-
suka-Susitna Borough, Alas., Ordinances 74-52 (Dec. 17, 1974); id. 75-15 (Mar. 27, 1975);
Woodbury, supra note 83, at 13. The Matansuka-Susitna Valley is the proposed site for a new
state capital. Plans to Shift Alaskan Capital Cause Concern, NY. Times, Nov. 7, 1976, § I, at
27, col. I.
Livermore, California, has a workable TDR program without state enabling legislation and
based only on an unadopted policy that suggests that a variety of means may be used to
accomplish the transfer of development rights. Letter to author from G. Musso, Director of
Planning, Livermore, Cal. (Nov. 2, 1976) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law
Review). See also Richards, Development Rights Transfer in Livermore: A Planning Strategy To
Conserve Open Space, 5 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 191 (1975). The Livermore experience shows
that some planning and zoning commissions can use TDR on a "do-it-yourself" basis.
Westwood Village, Los Angeles, California, has a small-area TDR program that illustrates
the use of TDR in promoting improved site design in developed environments. Los Angeles,
Cal., An Ordinance Establishing a Specific Plan for Westwood Village, Ordinance 145.043
(Aug. 24, 1973); Woodbury, supra at 13-14.
Hillsborough and Chesterfield, New Jersey, have transfer of development credits (TDC)
programs that differ from TDR in that under TDC the parcels in both the preservation and
transfer zones must be in the same ownership. TDC is an improvement over clustering since it
eliminates the need for contiguous parcels. In addition, TDC is thought to be enabled by
existing legislation. Hillsborough Township, New Jersey, Development Regulations Ordinance,
Ordinance No. 76-18, § 329 (Dec. 14, 1976); W. QUEALE, TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT CREDITS
TDC, A NEW FORM OF CLUSTER ZONING 3 (New Jersey Federation of Planning Officials,
Information Report XI, No. 1, 1976); Hillsborough Adopts Transfer of Developments Credit
Ordinance, supra note 56; Woodbury, supra at 14-15; Letter to the author from T. Peterson,
Hillsborough, New Jersey, Planning Administrator (Feb. 23, 1977) (copy on file in office of
North Carolina Law Review).
Boulder, Colorado, has a successful program under which the community has purchased
less-than-fee interests in land to control conversion of farmland and open space. The program
enjoys broad support from local citizens and is noteworthy for its financing arrangements and
flexibility. See BOULDER'S OPEN SPACE PLAN (1974); LESSONS FROM A GREENBELT PROGRAM,
BOULDER, COLORADO 9 (n.d.). Boulder, Colo., Ordinance 3288, § 11 (Nov. 7, 1967), is the basic
authority for allocation of the sales tax revenues that help finance the program. Boulder, Colo.,
Ordinance 3864 (Jan. 2, 1973), is a subsequent bond issue for open space acquisition. Boulder,
Colo., Ordinance 3940 (Sept. 16, 1973) creates the Open Space Board of Trustees and sets forth
their duties. The existing program parallels the plan outlined in a memorandum from the city
manager to the city council. Plan for Implementing the Greenbelt Program (Mar. 12, 1968) (copy
on file in office of North Carolina Law Review). In one acquisition, Boulder paid $1540 per acre
for the development rights on 172.3 acres. Tailored Open Space Acquisition Includes Devel-
opment Rights Purchase, 26 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Nov. 1974, at 4-5. The program "is
an example of the steps which can be taken in incremental fashion toward some of the more
rarified theoretical approaches to land use controls such as development rights, density transfer
schemes and land banking." Id.
Suffolk County, New York, has a PDR program that is remarkable not so much for its
success as for the long period of political dispute and cavil that preceded its adoption and
funding. For similar difficulties with the Chicago Plan, see note 145 and accompanying text
supra. The many reports in newspapers and other periodicals provide a full account of the
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one in St. George, Vermont, and the other in Buckingham Township,
Pennsylvania, are exemplary of TDR's potential as a land use guidance
technique. The St. George plan is radical yet it works because it is the best
solution to the seemingly intractable problem of extreme development
pressure. The Buckingham Township program is a model of conservative
incrementalism in that it integrates the TDR provisions with conventional
Euclidean zoning. It works because thoughtful planning has provided for
adequate incentives.
(1) St. George, Vermont
A TDR program intended to provide greater governmental control over
the development process is in use in St. George, Vermont. 217 This 2,304
events. See, in chronological order, Gupte, Preserving the Farms Is Not 'An Easy Task, N.Y.
Times, July 21, 1974, § 4, at 5, col. 3; Bryant & Conklin, New Farmland Preservation Programs
in New York, 41 J. AM. INST. OF PLANNERS 390, 394-95 (1975); Gupte, Suffolk is Offered 18,000
Acres, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1975, at 95, col. 6; Klein Is Seeking An Additional $23 Million to
Purchase Farmland in Suffolk, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1975, at 95, col. I; Klein Farm Plan in
Dispute, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1975, at 93, col. 2; Letter to the Editor from A. Lowen, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 7, 1975, § 4, at 16, col. 5; Gale & Yampolsky, Agri-Zoning: How They're Gonna
Keep 'Em Down on the Farm, 41 PLAN., Oct. 1975, at 17; Peterson & McCarthy, These Farmers
Said: "No Sale!", 41 PLAN., Oct. 1975, at 20; The Farms of Suffolk, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1975,
at 32, col. 1; Gupte, HungerjforLandIs Turning a Region of Choice Farms Into One of Houses,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1976, § 8, at IR, col. 1; Cummings, Save the Farmland, N.Y. Times, Apr.
4, 1976, § 21, at 41, col. 4; Vote For Farmlands, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1976, at 22, col. 1; Suffolk
Legislature Kills Plan To Preserve East End Farms, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1976, at 45, col. 11;
Suffolk Farmland, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1976, at 40, col. 1; Suffolk's Farm Plan Shelved, N.Y.
Times, May 16, 1976, § 4, at 7, col. 3; Gupte, The Fight That Everyone Lost, N.Y. Times, May
16, 1976, § 21, at 6, col. 7; Farmland Preservation Program Killed in Suffolk County, N. Y., 4
LAND USE PLAN. REP., May 24, 1976, at 7; Letter to the Long Island editor from L. Ruddell,
Southampton, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1976, § 21, at 28, col. 3; Farmland Preservation Bill
Authorizes Purchase of Suffolk County Development Rights, 4 LAND USE PLAN. REP., Sept. 13,
1976, at 5; Suffolk Begins Saving Its Farms, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1977, at 1, col. 5. See also
Suffolk County, N.Y., Local Law 19-1974 (June 14, 1974) (relating to the acquisition of
development rights in agricultural lands); REPORT OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY AGRICULTURAL
ADVISORY COMMITTEE I (Mar. 1974); SELECT COMM. ON THE ACQUISITION OF FARMLANDS,
REPORT TO THE SUFFOLK COUNTY LEGISLATURE (Nov. 7, 1974); Statistics on Farmland Devel-
opment and School Taxation (unpublished, compiled by John Klien, Suffolk County Executive,
Aug. 1974) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law Review).
Southampton, New York, has a TDR program that has proven unworkable thus far
because the economic incentives are inadequate. See Southampton, New York, Building
Zoning Ordinance No. 26 §§ 2-10-20, -40-30 (1972); Woodbury, supra at 15. A citizen's
organization, Group for America's South Fork, Inc. (GFASF), has proposed several changes to
the program including a requirement that developers prove they have made a bona fide effort to
sell their development rights before they are granted subdivision approval. GFASF, LEGAL
MEMORANDUM (n.d.); GFASF, PROPOSED ADDITION TO SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS (n.d.). Other
mimeographed materials of interest by GFASF include: DISCUSSION PAPER: THE MASTER PLAN
OF 1970 (n.d.); DISCUSSION PAPER: THE PRESENT TDR ORDINANCE (n.d.); PRESERVATION OF
FARMLAND IN THE TowN OF SOUTHAMPTON THROUGH TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS (n.d.).
See also S. Woodbury, Memorandum to Interested Parties: Housing Market Study of the Town
of Southampton, Long Island (Sept. 15, 1976) (unpublished, by planning consultant to the
GFASF, raising questions regarding the impact of TDR on housing) (copies of all these
materials on file in office of North Carolina Law Review).
217. See Hearing of Subcommittee on Rural Development of the Senate Committee on
acre town, ten miles southeast of Burlington, experienced more than a
fourfold increase in population in the decade ending in 1970.218 To ensure
control over the development of the town, the citizens purchased a fifty acre
site for a town center and sponsored a competition for the design of the
center and environs. In order to build in the center, a developer must first
transfer to the town the number of development rights equivalent to the
density of the intended development. 219 The developer's source of devel-
opment rights would be some unimproved parcel away from the center; he
would buy this parcel, strip away its development rights, and use them to
"pay" the town for the right to build in the center. 220 Th6 town maintains
control over central area development and receives a permanent restriction
preserving valued open space, while the developer gains the economic
advantage of being allowed to build in the accessible and valuable town
center.
221
So far, one transfer of eighteen development rights from thirty-six
undeveloped acres has been executed in St. George. In return for these
development rights, the developer received a long-term lease on a three acre
parcel on which he will build eighteen housing units, an industrial building
and a commercial facility.
222
The St. George Plan, as radical as it is,223 is still not a complete
substitute for existing regulations. While St. George may be the paradigm
for similarly situated rural areas confronted with development pressure,
Agriculture and Forestry, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 274-76 (1975) (statement of A.
Beliveau); ROBERT BURLEY ASSOCIATES, PEOPLE ON THE LAND 21-23 (1973) (prepared for
Vermont State Planning Office); Wilson, Precedent Setting Swap in Vermont, 61 AM. INST.
ARCH. J., Mar. 1974, at 51; Vermont Town Holds TDR as Tool to Control Future Development,
2 LAND USE PLAN. REP., July 29, 1974, at 5.
According to a St. George official: "The program has been used only once .... The
town is pleased with the TDR program and has no plans to change it. Its use has been limited to
date, but as the area expands so will its use." Letter to author from Stan Bradeen, St. George
Town Clerk's Administrative Assistant (Feb. 10, 1977) (copy on file in office of North Carolina
Law Review).
218. The population increased from 108 to 477. ROBERT BURLEY ASSOcIATES, supra note
217, at 21.
219. Id. at 22.
220. See Hearings of Subcommittee on Rural Development of the Senate Committee on
Agriculture and Forestry, supra note 217, at 274-76.
221. See id.
222. 'Instead-of Program'Helps St. George Get Town Center, Burlington Free Press, Sept.
1, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
223. From the historical perspective, the St. George plan may not be so radical. Based on
an original settlement design by General James Oglethorpe, the City of Savannah beginning in
1790 achieved unique and highly satisfactory planned development by using its ownership of
the common and employing a system of regulated sales and leases. Reps, Public Land, Urban
Development Policy, and the American Planning Tradition, in MODERNIZING URBAN LAND
POLICY 41.48 (M. Clawson ed. 1973).
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built-up areas would have some difficulty in making effective use of such a
plan. This is true because the patterns of central area development in such
areas are established. It might be possible for more developed towns to buy
residential land at the edge of commercial areas, upzone it and then apply
the St. George Plan. By this method a town could capture the windfall
profits that would otherwise go to a private owner.
224
(2) Buckingham Township, Pennsylvania
In effect since March 1975 as a provision of the zoning ordinance, the
TDR option in Buckingham Township, Pennsylvania, is designed to pre-
serve agricultural land.225 Landowners in the agricultural district receive one
development certificate for each acre.226 Their development rights can then
be sold to landowners in the three higher density residential districts.227 The
minimum site area in the receiving districts is only two to five acres and
developers are allowed to increase the density on the receiving sites by about
one dwelling unit per acre for each development right purchased. 228 The
maximum densities in the receiving districts are 140 to 613 percent of that
normally allowed with the greatest density increases available in areas with
sewerage.
229
Conveyance of development rights requires the seller to restrictively
covenant his land and rezones the land into an agricultural preservation
district permitting only one residence in every twenty-five acres. 230 So far, a
sales agreement has been made to transfer twelve development rights at
$1800 each. This price is at the lower end of a range of estimates made by
the county planners. 231 Another sales agreement for twenty rights at $2000
each has reportedly been made. 2
32
224. Equally important, in both the case of the St. George plan and the hypothetical use in a
more developed setting, is the ability of TDR to increase nodal density and to enhance effective
planning, thereby reducing economic, environmental and natural resource consumption, and
the personal costs associated with sprawl. See REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION, THE
COSTS OF SPRAWL 6 (1974).
225. The discussion that follows is based upon Buckingham Township, Pa., Zoning Ordi-
nance of 1975 art. V, § 502 & art. VI (Mar. 18, 1976) (amending Buckingham Township, Pa.,
Zoning Ordinance of 1975 (Mar. 6, 1975)).
226. Id. art. VI, § 602.
227. Id.
228. See id. art. V, § 502 & art. VI, § 603.
229. Id.
230. Id. art. VI, § 602(d).
231. Woodbury, supra note 83, at 15.
232. SEDWAY/COOKE, supra note 24, at 24. Unfortunately, a Bucks County, Pennsylvania,
court has declared the Buckingham zoning ordinance invalid. The decision was rendered in a
case brought by seven developers whose request to build 7,105 housing units was denied and
who claimed the ordinance was exclusionary. Busting Up Buckingham, The Philadelphia
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Analysis of the literature available on the Buckingham provisions233
does not reveal why TDR works in this case. As noted above, density
increases available under this TDR program are substantial, transfer zones
cover a wide area and the small minimum area requirement for receiving
sites in the transfer zones enables owners of small parcels to make use of
development rights. Altogether, these characteristics provide strong
economic incentives for voluntary participation and make it possible for
owners of relatively small parcels to be purchasers of development rights.
IV. THE ECONOMICS OF TDR
An understanding of TDR economics is critical in planning workable
programs. The principal economic concerns are: first, the valuation and
allocation of development rights; second, the maintenance of sufficient
demand to clear the market at a reasonable price; and third, the incidence of
costs.
A. Allocation of Development Rights
Measuring and allocating development rights that may be transferred
by landowners in pure density terms-for example, each twenty acre farm
zoned for one dwelling unit per acre receives twenty development rights that
can be used elsewhere to increase site density by twenty units--does not
always reflect the actual development potential of the land and forces zoning
limits to serve as a basis for compensation for transferred development
rights. 4 One frequently cited alternative is to use the difference in value of
Evening Bull., Dec. 1, 1976, at 6, col. 1 (editorial). See notes 277-78 and accompanying text
infra for a discussion of Buckingham's inclusionary provisions.
A somewhat analogous scheme has been proposed by the planning firm of Sedway/Cooke
for preserving farmland and open space in Sonoma County, California. The principal difference
is that development rights under the Sedway/Cooke proposal would be distributed to owners of
land in the preservation zone on the basis of assessed land value, an allocation formula that is
thought to be fairer because it better reflects development potential. Each development right,
however, would still be equal to one dwelling unit per acre. SEDWAY/COOKE, supra at
61, 66. This is an excellent, almost definitive, report of current TDR activity and problems.
Sedway/Cooke also produced a SUMMARY REPORT (1976). An earlier report by county planners
is of interest because it argues for a novel "concentric ring theory" of differential allocation of
development rights. SONOMA COUNTY PLANNING DEP'T, THE POTENTIAL FOR DENSITY TRANS-
FER IN SONOMA COUNTY: A PILOT STUDY 16 (1974). The planners were obviously influenced by
Burgess's concentric ring theory of land use. See Burgess, The Growth of the City: An
Introduction to a Research Project, in THE CrrY 47 (1967).
233. See authorities cited in notes 231-32 supra.
234. In discussing this problem and attempting to explain the failure of a proposed TDR
program, one town's planning board chairman said:
Some other points that have been raised is that our Town is surrounded on 2 sides by
water; and the land on or near the water happens to be the most expensive around.
There can be no possible equalization for a development right that is taken "out of"
the coastal area and transferred to the morraine area in terms of value, unless it
involves the granting of 1 1/2 rights which would eventually result in an increased
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the parcel with and without its development rights. 235 This measure, howev-
er, requires expensive appraising and would be subject to frequent chal-
lenge. It has been suggested that allocation on the basis of the value of land
alone "appears to provide the best balance between simplicity and fair-
ness," but that properties in the preservation area may have to have their
assessments brought up to date before there can be allocations based on land
value. 236 While supporters of this view claim the cost is relatively small,
237
the burden may exceed the benefit in communities with outdated assess-
ments and large preservation areas. Such localities will probably measure
and allocate development rights on den sity terms alone.
Ease of administration is an important consideration in choosing a
method of allocation, especially since preservation of farmland and open
space will be principally the concern of exurban areas that usually lack
professional planning and often have difficulty administering rudimentary
zoning and subdivision controls. Therefore, small communities with limited
resources will tend to use density equivalents, while more sophisticated
local jurisdictions can make the best use of land value allocations and more
esoteric variants, such as physical capability for development (so-called
"carrying capacity") or locational probability of development.238
B. Market Maintenance
The lesson learned from Tudor Parks239 is that there must be a market
for development rights or mandatory schemes risk invalidation. 24° Volun-
tary schemes will not work unless sufficient incentives exist to stimulate
overall density. If the land was generally of the same character and value, this would
not be so much of a problem, but the overall increased density would seem a very
strong prohibition, and the facilities that might be needed to support this density
(sewage, water).
Letter to the author from Thomas E. Halsey, Chairman Town Planning Board, Southampton,
N.Y. (Oct. 4, 1976) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law Review).
235. See, e.g., Schimmel, New Appraisal Concepts-Valuation of Air Rights and Devel-
opment Rights, in I LEGAL AND APPRAISAL ASPECTS OF CONDEMNATION 19 (Real Estate Law
and Practice Course Handbook No. 80, 1973).
236. SEDWAY/COOKE, supra note 24, at 61. Illustrative of the utter lack of agreement
regarding allocation formulae is an opinion in direct contradiction of the Sedway/Cooke posi-
tion: "[A]ssessed valuation which has been suggested as a base for distribution of development
rights is the worst possible standard." Graaskamp, Impressions on the Marketability of TDRs,
in PAS, supra note 32, at 20.
237. SEDWAY/COOKE, supra note 24, at 61.
238. Id. at 55-61 lists eight allocation alternatives: (I) acreage, (2) zoning, (3) general plan,
(4) physical capability of development, (5) locational probability of development, (6) value of
foregone development potential, (7) value of property, and (8) value of land.
239. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381,
385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1973). This case is discussed at text accompanying notes 103-16 supra.
240. See text accompanying notes 107-09 supra.
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private transfers. 24 1 There are two methods of ensuring adequate demand.
First, demand may be enhanced by designating relatively large transfer
areas, by downzoning transfer areas, by providing substantial increases in
density maximums for receiving sites in the transfer zones and by minimiz-
ing transaction costs. The Buckingham Township ordinance takes this
approach. 242 The Chicago Plan exemplifies the other method of ensuring
demand-it uses a bank to purchase development rights when the private
market is incapable of clearing them at a price that will compensate the
seller for his loss of development potential.243
As two economists candidly admit, a free market in development rights
"can be very complex.' '244 Several interactive conditions can be identified
in such a market. Holders of development rights may act as if they are
marginal landowners, next in line for development, and perceive an unreal-
istically high value for their real property rights. 245 Empirical evidence of
this tendency is found in a study of participation in California's Williamson
Act program of preferential assessment. 24 In the Sacramento area, the
optimum participation rate was calculated to be at least 80%,247 yet only
13.9 to 49.8%248 of area landowners were involved in the program. This
presumably occurred because many owners over-estimated their chances of
windfall gains through the development of their land.249 The effect of these
241. "The success or failure of development rights programs will depend in large part,
however, on whether these simple matters of compensation are worked out in practice." B.
Field & J. Conrad, Economics of Compensation in Development Rights Programs (n.d.)
(mimeograph) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Field
I]. In economic terms supply is as important as demand in establishing the equilibrium price, but
in most TDR situations the property to be preserved is fixed in area and value. Therefore,
though some adjustments can be and are made on the supply side, the focus will usually be on
demand.
242. See text accompanying notes 225-32 supra.
243. See text accompanying note 140 supra. But as one report points out, having the local
government act as "broker" opens the door to abuse. SEDWAY/COOKE, supra note 24, at A-3.
This potential for abuse of discretion is one criticism of the Town and Country Planning Act,
1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c.51. Wendt, Administrative Problems, supra note 64, at 432.
244. Field I, supra note 241, at 8.
245. B. Field & J. Conrad, Economic Considerations in Establishing Development Rights
Programs for Community Land-Use Management 4 (October 1975) (mimeograph) (copy on file
in office of North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Field II]. See also Field &
Conrad, Economic Issues in Programs of Transferable Development Rights, 51 LAND ECON.
331, 333 (1975).
246. Hansen & Schwartz, Landowner Behavior at the Rural-Urban Fringe in Response to
Preferential Property Taxation, 51 LAND EcoN. 341 (1975). The Williamson Act is discussed at
text accompanying notes 188-91 supra.
247. Hansen & Schwartz, supra note 246, at 350.
248. Id. at 345-46. In the Foothill area, about 20 to 30 miles from the core, 49.8% of the land
was enrolled, while in the Stone Lake/Franklin area, about 10 miles from the core, 13.9% of the
land was enrolled. Id.
249. The authors conclude that "landowners are overly optimistic about potential gains
from future development, and that is the major reason for low CLCA [use value taxation) urban
fringe enrollment." Id. at 351.
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unreasonable expectations is to inflate the asking price for development
rights, thereby reducing demand and the quantity of development rights
transferred.
The timing and sequence of the sale of development rights also affects
the equilibrium price. If the development rights are transferred from Black-
acre, adjacent Whiteacre enjoys an increment of value by reason of its
location next to preserved open space. Whiteacre's owner will consequently
demand a higher price for his development rights. 50
Moreover, the developer seeks an optimal combination of houses and
land. Increasing densities reduce the cost per dwelling unit of site im-
provements25 1 but at high densities living environments become less desir-
able and total revenues decrease. Public officials will have difficulty iden-
tifying this point of private profit maximization.
PDR programs raise even more troublesome issues because they result
in windfall profits to those developers who hold unrestricted land that
increases in value as land of that sort becomes scarce or that enjoys the
positive externalities of preserved open space. Moreover, the uniform pric-
ing and purchase of development rights from entire parcels causes the
acquiring government unit to pay far more than is necessary to prevent
marginal conversions.252 That is, Farmer has, as shown in figure 1, a
downward sloping value of marginal product (VMP) curve; each additional
acre of land has a diminishing marginal productivity. This curve de-
scribes the present value of the farm as a farm. Now, suppose Developer
asks Farmer to sell part of the 100 acre farm so Developer can build his "El
Rancho" subdivision. Developer offers $5000/acre for as much land as
Farmer will sell. This price, "PsuB" is the value per acre to Developer of a
portion of Farmer's land suitable for development of a subdivision. Since
the price curve (the dotted line at PsuB) intersects VMP at eighty acres
(point A), Fanner will sell twenty acres to Developer for $100,000.
When Town hears of the possible Farmer-Developer deal it is horror-
struck at the possible loss of part of Farmer's agrarian paradise. If Town
250. Field II, supra note 245, at 7; Field I, supra note 241, at 7. But the anticipation of
future profits at Whiteacre may not cause Whiteacre's owners to hold out since the ability to
"wait and see" depends on other factors, principally current wealth. See Field & Conrad,
supra note 245, at 333.
251. Field II, supra note 245, at 11. See also A. SCHMmT, CONVERTING LAND FROM RURAL
TO URBAN USES 20 (1968) (showing, for example, that as lot size is increased from 2,500 to 7,000
square feet, the cost of improvements (streets, utilities, grading) and the total cost of the lot
more than double).
252. Field II, supra note 245, at 16. The discussion that follows and the graph (figure 1) are
adapted in part from Field I, supra note 241, at 5.
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FIGURE 1: PRICING STRATEGY
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purchases the fee interest in Farmer's entire parcel it will have to pay a price
that approaches PALL, $7000/acre, or $700,000 for the parcel. 253 Farmer
would sell all of his land only if offered more than $5000/acre because the
fewer acres he has, the more valuable they are to him. This is true because
the first few acres are more productive than the last few acres. That is why
the VMP curve is higher to the left where the acreage is less.
If Town follows the procedure of most TDR programs, it will offer to
buy or create incentives for the transfer of the development rights from the
entire parcel with the development rights valued at $4000/acre, which is the
difference between the marginal price that would have to be offered for the
fee interest in the entire farm and the marginal farm use value ($3000).
Thus, Town will pay, or attempt to get others to pay, a total of approximate-
ly $400,000 ($4000/acre x 100 acres).
If Town had some way to just exceed the difference between the
marginal farm use value for the twenty acres and the price offered by the
Developer, it could stop development on the twenty acres. Specifically,
253. More precisely, the total price paid for the 100 acres would be the area under the VMP
curve. If the VMP curve were a horizontal line at $7,000, the total price would be $700,000. In
this case, the total price for the fee interest in the 100 acres is actually less than $700,000
because the curve is downwardly sloping. For reasons of simplicity (integral calculus would
normally be used to compute the area under the curve), $700,000 is chosen to complete the
example.
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Town would outbid Developer if it offered an amount equal to the shaded
area ABC plus $1-a total of about $20,000 or one-twentieth as much as
Town would have to pay for all the development rights.
254
In those PDR systems that use bid offers the government can come
close to this minimum stop-conversion price if the landowner offers devel-
opment rights only on the area he is otherwise willing to sell to developers,
if the bid offer is not inflated by unreasonable expectations of windfall
gains, and if the government can accurately predict that this particular parcel
is likely to be developed in the near future. This combination of conditions
is unlikely to occur on a regular basis. TDR programs with banks face the
same conditional imperatives; those without banks have no hope of guaran-
teeing minimum incentives since they do not control the order in which
parcels have their rights bid away. s5 Proposed later in this article256 is a new
administrative procedure that will permit the purchase of development rights
under such a marginal strategy during periods when development threatens
key areas and the private market fails to support the transfer of development
rights. The point to be emphasized from the present discussion is that
existing PDR and TDR programs are economically inefficient. Given the
limited resources available, less land can be preserved under present pro-
grams than would be under more efficient schemes.
C. The Incidence of Costs
The other important issue in TDR economics is the decision as to which
groups should bear the burden. 7 Presumably, communities apply TDR
because they believe the technique can assist in effecting a more desirable
pattern of land uses, thereby increasing social welfare.258 While some
254. This assumes, as is the practice in existing TDR programs, that the land would be
assessed at use value after conveyance of the development rights.
255. Moreover, active, full-time development rights banks increase the transaction costs,
at least doubling them if the rights are resold. The government's ideal role might be to serve
only as an auctioneer. Field & Conrad, supra note 245, at 338.
256. See text accompanying notes 315-41 infra.
257. See Shlaes, Who Pays for Transfer of Development Rights?, 40 PLAN., July 1974, at 7,
reprinted in TDR, supra note 20, at 330.
258. The justification for changing the private land use decision and thus for increasing
the costs is the same as that suggested for control of the location of a public work: the
benefit to general welfare from decreasing or eliminating an external cost (or from
locating an external benefit where it is most valuable) exceeds the loss to the general
welfare arising from less efficient and more expensive locations.
Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 659 (1958).
When a community imposes a TDR scheme on itself, it is, in a sense, acting in accordance
with the Coase theorem, which asserts that regardless of the tort rule used, the same output will
be produced. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). The harmful activity
is development and the community has two choices. It may allow development to continue
under existing zoning and ultimately pay "damages" of increased taxes associated with urban
sprawl and of lost open space. Or the community may "bribe" itself by assuming the cost of
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commentators imply that the use of TDR is costless, 259 there are important
distributional issues. Assume, for example, a TDR program without a bank.
Developers who must pay for development rights experience an increase in
production cost and may not be willing to pay as much for land in the
transfer zone as they would if the right to develop at the same density were
unconditional. 260 That is, landowners in the transfer zone will bear part of
the cost of TDR in the form of a reduction in the market value of their
property. Since TDR is providing a density bonus as an incentive, however,
the actual loss to the transfer zone owner is no greater than his potential
"windfall profit' '-the increment in value attributable to increased opportu-
nities for development resulting from government investment in physical
capital or upzoning. At worst, the transfer zone landowner loses an unearn-
ed profit. In some instances, the landowner may actually enjoy an increase
in the market value of his property when TDR provides the density neces-
sary to justify development of marginal land.
261
Developers will avoid participating in TDR programs if they must
experience an increase in costs without a greater increase in revenues. In
many instances the increased density may provide economies of scale and
reduce unit production costs, thereby permitting the developer to undersell
non-TDR competitors and providing consumers with a larger surplus. This
is precisely the driving force behind the widespread adoption and use of
clustering and PUD provisions. In addition, the resultant preferred urban
form makes the community a more desirable place in which to live, bidding
up the price of all property-particularly land near the preserved areas.
262
One redistributive effect, a "negative externality" in the parlance of
economics, 263 must be minimized if TDR is to succeed. It has been alleged
establishing a TDR program, by increasing central area densities, and, if necessary to provide
sufficient incentives for private transfers, by accepting somewhat higher overall density. The
Coase theorem applied to this closed system seems somewhat peculiar, but it is nevertheless
appropriate because the community is faced with the same alternatives as Coase's rancher-it
can take present profits and face the prospect of future damages, or it can bribe its landowners
to produce a more efficient pattern of land use and avoid long-run increased costs.
259. Chavooshian & Norman, Transfer of Development Rights: A New Concept in Land
Use Management, 32 URB. LAND, Dec. 1973, at 11, 13.
260. Field II, supra note 245, at 21.
261. On the one hand, transfer zone landowners may lose since their monopolistic position
and ability to hold out is eroded by the developer's opportunity under TDR to substitute the
purchase of additional development rights for the purchase of additional land. On the other
hand, since development rights provide greater economies of scale, owners of marginal, small
parcels in the transfer zone will be able to bring their property into production with TDR. See
Shlaes, The Economics of Development Rights Transfers, 42 APPRAISAL J. 526, 536 (1974).
262 Field II, supra note 245, at 7; Field I, supra note 241, at 7.
263. "Negative externalities" are external costs. "[I]f one builds a singularly ugly house,
his neighbors suffer." D. NErzan, ECONOMICS AND URBAN PROBLEMS 8 (1970). For a brief
introduction to the concept, see W. HIRSCH, URBAN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 22-26 (1973).
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that higher densities in developed areas threaten the physical and psycholog-
ical well-being of nearby residents. 264 The New York City experience may
be an extreme case, but increased densities, even in exurban transfer zones,
may cause land near the developed sites to become less desirable. 265 Careful
site design and planning, however, can reduce or eliminate these adverse
externalities. 266 The belief that lower densities necessarily result in better
living environments is naive and the root cause of suburban sprawl.267 The
argument that TDR is passing the "density buck" to those residing in or
near the transfer zone. is specious.
PDR programs, which require public financial support, raise additional
questions about funding arrangements and the distribution of costs. State
funded programs, like those existing in New Jersey268 and proposed for
Connecticut,269 substantially separate the burden from the benefit. 270 County
264. See, e.g., Note, supra nofe 22, at 371-72.
265. J. Marlin, The Eionomics of Transferable Development Rights 41, 49 (1975) (unpub-
lished paper, Council on Municipal Performance) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law
Review).
266. The rationale behind density bonuses with clustering, PUD and special development
districts is that the improved site design results in a net improvement in public welfare while the
increased density gives an incentive to voluntary participation. But when zealous planners err
on the side of over-regulation in administering flexible zoning provisions, they rigidify design.
A Little Zoning Is a Good Thing, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1977, § A, at 20, col. i.
267. Moreover, planners simply do not yet understand what relationship, if any, exists
between development density and psychological well-being. Man is adaptive and his relation-
ship with built environments is interactive. "Designed environments, then, should be both
conceptualized and realized as dynamic systems capable of moving toward more appropriate
states.. . . The entire process is thus analyzable as an iterative one." Studer, The Dynamics of
Behavior--Contingent Physical Systems, in ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 56, 73 (1st ed. H.
Proshanski, W. Ittelson & L. Rivlin eds. 1970). "iT]here is not much reason to believe that
density (short of great extremes) causes pathology. The effects of density are highly dependent
on individual, situational (social and architectural), and cultural factors." Fischer, Baldassare
& Ofshe, Crowding Studies and Urban Life: A Critical Review, 41 J. Am. INST. OF PLANNERS
406, 411 (1975).
268. See notes 198-200 and accompanying text supra.
269. See notes 201-03 and accompanying text supra.
270. Federal support of PDR further separates the burden from the benefit except to the
extent that the community foregoes spending in other areas as would be the case with multipur-
pose block grants-those programs that allow communities wide discretion in spending lump
sum federal payments. The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, § 105(a)(1)(c),
42 U.S.C. § 5305(a)(1)(c) (Supp. V 1975), for example, permits the use of federal funds for
acquisition of real property "for the preservation or restoration of historic sites, the beautifica-
tion of urban land, the conservation of open spaces, natural resources, and scenic areas, the
provision of recreational opportunities, or the guidance of urban development." Id. §
5305(a)(1)(c). The community development block grant program replaced the open land acquisi-
tion program in Title VII of the Housing Act of 1961. HUD Community Block Grants Regula-
tions, 24 C.F.R. § 570.1(c)(6) (1976). See also id. § 570.200(a)(iii) (1976) (reiterating that
acquisition of open space is an eligible activity).
Also, under the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 3121-3246(h) (West 1977), states must include planning for open spaces. Arguably, com-
munities may include the costs of buffer open space in connection with public works and
development facility projects in their project costs. EDA Public Works and Development
Facilities Program, Rules and Regulations, 13 C.F.R. § 305.65 (1977).
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programs bring the cost closer to the beneficiaries. Local efforts can most
closely align expense with profit. The intergovernmental distribution of
costs and the choice of funding sources are complex questions of public
policy.
271
Some elemental propositions of financing should be obvious. Many
benefits of TDR/PDR extend beyond local boundaries. Preserved farmland
and open space serve at least intrastate regional needs and in some cases
272
their benefits may be enjoyed nationally and internationally. Some funding
by both state and federal governments is therefore justified under the
principle that beneficiaries should bear their share of the burden. Moreover,
programs that result in the preservation of substantial proportions of unde-
veloped land in local jurisdictions are going to severely restrict the growth of
the local tax base and shift the burden of local property taxes to those whose
land is already developed or unrestricted.273 One partial solution may be to
have states reimburse localities for lost ad valorem taxes by making pay-
ments proportionate to the benefits that are enjoyed by citizens at the
regional and state levels.
Other important issues are the progressive or regressive effects of the
tax base, the distribution of burden between landowners and those who do
not own real property, and the distribution over time between present and
future residents. One approach to local funding that is capable of capturing
future windfalls while providing present resources is issuing bonds and
repaying them from a one time tax on real estate. This PDR assessment
could be repayable with interest overthe life of the bonds at the landowner's
271. The discussion of these issues is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper. A
problem of major significance is what is the proper geographic area for TDR planning. This
article's assumption that individual towns can use TDR is based less on the conviction that
individual programs are best than on the belief that regional planning is not politically feasible.
At least one commentator agrees that TDR planners will continue to have difficulties with their
programs until they take a more regional approach. Telephone conversation with J. Conrad (co-
author of Field I, supra note 241, and Field II, supra note 245) (Sept. 1, 1977).
272. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 159-67 supra, describing the need to preserve
Florida's citrus groves and Puerto Rico's Phosphorescent Bay.
273. When land is preserved it is then taxed on its new lower market value. Since most
towns depend principally on the real property tax for their revenues, tax rates will increase
when the base is reduced through preservation of some parcels. Owners of developed or
unrestricted land will bear a greater proportion of the burden. Presumably with TDR there will
be little net change in the tax base since Lhe parcel that receives the development rights will
increase in assessed value. Under PDR programs, however, there is likely to be marked change
in the distribution of the tax burden. See UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 17, at 118-20 for a
detailed discussion of similar redistributive effects that result under differential tax schemes.
For example, in a study of 151 rural New Jersey townships, 40% had increases in their tax rates
of 20-50% when the differential tax program reduced assessments on participating land. Id. at
119. Presently, there is no empirical evidence and no discussion in the literature regarding the
redistribution of the tax burden in TDR programs.
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option. Repayment could be accelerated upon sale of the property when the
seller realized the windfall gain attributable to the local PDR program.
274
Funds to operate TDR programs using a bank could be raised in the same
manner.
PDR, and TDR if it results in increased housing costs, could have
exclusionary effects.275 Other things being equal, PDR will reduce the
development potential for the entire community and, with supply reduced
and demand unchanged, the equilibrium price of land will increase, reduc-
ing the development of housing in the lower price ranges. Similarly, if
community public welfare is improved by TDR, land prices will increase.
276
But reduction in housing supply and increase in price need not be the
rule since inclusionary zoning techniques are available to offset PDR/TDR
exclusionary effects. In one program, for example, each unit of housing
developers build under federal or state subsidy programs allows them to
build one additional dwelling unit on the same parcel up to a maximum
density of twenty percent in excess of that normally allowed. 277 With
privately-subsidized housing selling for less than $28,500 in 1975 dollars
for a two bedroom unit, the township ordinance allows a 1.2 dwelling unit
density increase for each unit built, with maximum density subject to the
twenty percent excess constraint. Subsidized units may be mixed with
nonsubsidized units and cannot be physically segregated from the rest of the
development. 278
274. If the property was sold at a loss, repayment could be excused. Krasnowiecki and
Paul, in an article written during PDR's Proterozoic era, proposed that open space areas be
designated and restricted with compensation to be deferred until an administratively supervised
public sale of the property. Thus, compensation would not include accruals to development
value subsequent to the imposition of controls. Krasnowiecki & Paul, The Preservation of Open
Space In Metropolitan Areas, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 179, 198-200 (1961). The proposal is not
unlike the program of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 51,
discussed at text accompanying note 68 supra.
275. The location of New Jersey's five million dollar PDR experiment is Burlington Coun-
ty, the county in which Mt. Laurel is located. New Jersey Plans Farmland Preservation
Program, 4 LAND USE PLAN. REP., June 21, 1976, at 6. In a landmark decision, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that Mt. Laurel must have land regulations that enable and encourage the
development of the township's "fair share" of the region's demand for low and moderate
income housing. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
188, 336 A.2d 713, 732 (1975). One of New Jersey's most knowledgeable commentators on
TDR/PDR has expressed concern over the exclusionary effects of the Burlington County
experiment. Letter to the author from John Helb (Sept. 13. 1976) (copy on file in office of North
Carolina Law Review).
276. See text accompanying note 261 supra.
277. Buckingham Township, Pa., Zoning Ordinance of 1975, § 504 (Mar. 18, 1976)
("Low and Moderate Income Housing Bonus"). The ordinance does not specify what subsidy
programs it contemplates, but presumably it is meant to imply those programs that subsidize the
building of low and moderate income housing.
278. Id. In addition, § 504 requires that the developer have a township-approved manage-
ment plan setting eligibility rules and ensuring both that units are sold and resold only to eligible
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Perhaps the best way to avoid intentional and incidental exclusionary
effects is to mandate similar inclusionary approaches in state enabling
legislation. PDR and TDR programs should at least include rudimentary
provisions encouraging an expanded supply of housing for low and moder-
ate income families and a wide range of housing types.2 79 Inclusionary
efforts at this experimental stage of PDR/TDR development would be
enhanced by requiring periodic reports on the characteristics of the housing
stock to a state agency, which would assess the need for different or more
definitive inclusionary requirements.
2 80
V. THE QUEST FOR A LEGAL THEORY
Except for the aberrational New York City experience, 281 TDR has not
been tested in the courts. But much has been written with little agreement
concerning its appropriate legal characterization. 282 The primary questions
are whether TDR will invoke the issue of governmental taking without just
compensation and what levels of compensation for development rights are
appropriate if the condemnation power is used. Of course, voluntary plans
avoid most problems of legal theory except the minor issue of naming the
restriction on development that results from conveying away the devel-
opment potential. That problem is settled by state enabling legislation, local
regulations that specify the nature of the restriction or dependency on one of
several traditional legal characterizations, such as easements, real coven-
ants, or equitable servitudes.
283
people and that value increases are limited so as'to avoid excluding low and moderate income
individuals on resales. Southampton, New York, similarly allows for a density increase with
low and moderate income housing, but their procedures are more elaborate and do not attempt
to tie the bonus to "subsidized" housing. Southampton, N.Y., Building Zone Ordinance No. 26
§ 2-10-20.04 (May 1972), reprinted in TDR, supra note 20, at 246. Density bonuses could be tied
to the TDR program. For example, a developer who builds low and moderate income housing
could be allowed to develop at the upper-tier density with fewer development rights than the
developer who builds non-subsidized housing. Another alternative would be to require every
community to have some percentage of moderately priced units. See Rose, The Mandatory
Percentage of Moderately Priced Dwelling (MPMPD) Ordinance Is the Latest Technique of
Inclusionary Zoning, in TDR, supra note 20, at 252.
279. For background on the exclusionary problem with suggested strategies, see A.
DowNs, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS (1973).
280. Unfortunately, the experience with PDR/TDR has been too limited to permit empirical
analysis of exclusionary impacts.
281. See text accompanying notes 76-132 supra.
282. It seems settled that TDR does not violate the doctrines of uniformity, accordance
with the comprehensive plan and dollar compensation. See generally J. CoSTONIS, supra note I,
at 145-66; Eckert, Acquisition of Development Rights: A Modern Land Use Tool, 23 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 347, 353-60 (1969); Richards, supra note 216, at 205-17.
283. The Town of Eden, New York, has a local TDR ordinance that specifies the type of
restrictive easement required and includes a form instrument to be completed by the landowner
who sells his development rights. Eden, N.Y., Local Law No. I, §§ 5.10.2, .4 app. I (1977).
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Mandatory programs with condemnation, such as the Chicago Plan,
raise the question 'f fair compensation for the development rights. While
the example described by figure 1.28 sets the value of development rights as
the difference between the value as developed land and the value as farm-
land, Costonis has for several years stated that "fair" compensation is to be
found somewhere between eminent domain's just compensation measured
by the land's highest and best use and the police power's lack of compensa-
tion.2 85 The standard he chooses is "Reasonable Beneficial Use," which is
a less intensive use than "Highest and Best Use Unrestricted by Public
Regulation" or "Allowable Use," but a more intensive use than "Resource
Protection Use' 'or "Zero Intensity Use.'"286 If regulation reduced economic
return from the use of the property below "Reasonable Beneficial Use,"
then the government could use what Costonis calls the "Accommodation
Power" and take one of three actions. First, it could ease the restrictions on
the property's use, thereby returning the property to reasonable beneficial
use. Second, fair compensation, defined as a money payment equal to the
difference between allowable use and reasonable beneficial use, could be
paid to the landowner. And finally, instead of a money payment for fair
compensation, the government could give the landowner an equivalent
number of development rights.
287
Berger replied to the Costonis proposal, arguing that reasonable benefi-
cial use is not a new standard and that state courts have been upholding
police power regulations that leave property owners with even less than
reasonable beneficial use.288 Using the oft-cited case of Just v. Marinette
County28 9 as an example, Berger demonstrates how difficult it is to calculate
reasonable beneficial use, but he calls that exercise "child's play" in
comparison to converting just compensation into development rights. 29°
Berger concludes that the issue of reasonable compensation cannot be
reduced to a simple formulation, since the balancing of public benefit
against private detriment "depends upon human perceptions and attitudes
and intuitions which we cannot reduce to metric measure. "291 Thus, while
284. See text accompanying notes 252-54 supra.
285. See Costonis, A New Approach to the Taking Issue, 42 PLAN., Jan. 1976, at 18.
286. Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes For the
Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021, 1050 (1975).
287. See id. at 1052.
288. Berger, The Accommodation Power in Land Use Controversies: A Reply to Professor
Costonis, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 799,817 (1976) (citing Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183
(1928), as the origin of the "no adequate return" test which Berger believes is equivalent to the
"reasonable beneficial use" test proposed by Costonis).
289. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (upholding restrictions against filling wetlands).
290. Berger, supra note 288, at 822.
291. Id. at 823.
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Costonis argues for a new compensation calculus and Berger questions its
novelty and practicality, TDR is left sitting somewhere along the traditional
construct of the police power-taking continuum.292
Bosselman, Callies and Banta have convincingly demonstrated through
a discussion of the history of land regulation and an analysis of case law that
the taking clause has been mythologized by Americans who believe they can
do as they please with their land.293 Holmes made that myth a part of
American real property law by his statement in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon294 that, "The general rule at least is, that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking." ' 295 This unsatisfactory balancing test has driven courts to
cliches, has rendered Costonis' efforts futile and has forced Berger to
characterize the issue as based on intuitions and human perceptions. In their
analysis of governmental strategies for coping with the taking issue, Bossel-
man, Callies and Banta suggested that courts reassume the strict construc-
tion of the taking clause intended by the draftsmen. 296 Consistent with this
return to strict construction would be the readoption of the rule in Mugler v.
Kansas297 that a taking only occurs when property is taken away or appro-
292. The term "police power-taking continuum" is adopted for use in this section as a
shorthand notation for the traditional view that land use regulations may be imposed without
compensation if they bear a substantial relation to the general welfare, but if restrictive
regulations go too far, they will be held to be a taking. The tests for a valid exercise of the police
power require: "(1) that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; (2) that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose; and (3) that the means are not unduly oppressive upon
individuals." Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor of Maryland, 266 Md. 358, 373, 293
A.2d 241, 249, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972) (upholding state law prohibiting gravel
extraction from tidal areas). If the restrictions go too far, the courts, under the traditional view,
have held them to be equivalent to a taking. State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970). A valid
exercise of police power usually has been distinguished from a taking only by the degree to
which it conforms to the tests described above. Therefore, it is proper to characterize the
traditional view as a "police power-taking continuum." Unfortunately, "Judicial opinions
rejecting constitutional attacks . . . seldom provide reliable guides to the relevant substantive
standards" as to what constitutes a valid exercise of the police power. Van Alstyne, Taking or
Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV.
1, 13 (1971).
293. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973) [hereinafter cited as
THE TAKING ISSUE]. Or as former Oregon Governor Tom McCall posits:
At work here is the American ethic-rugged individualism, unlimited growth,
every man for himself. But related to land abuse, I call it the buffalo hunter mentali-
ty-use up the resource until it's all gone, and then look elsewhere for new quarry. We
can't do that with the land. It's a finite resource, and we've got to look at it in that
context. All the land we're ever going to have is in front of us, and we can't accept our
past use and misuse of it as a guide for the future.
CITIZENS' ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, How WILL AMERICA GRow? 33
(1976).
294. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
295. Id. at 415.
296. TIlE TAKING ISSUE, supra note 293, at 236.
297. 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upholding police power regulation which rendered a brewery
valueless).
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priated for government use. The view in Mugler is that a police power
regulation is different in kind, not different in degree, and that it can rarely
constitute a compensable taking.298 Such a regulation is only valid or invalid
depending upon its ability to meet the test of rational relationship to the
public welfare. 299 This return to strict construction would ultimately result in
a Supreme Court overruling of Pennsylvania Coal.
In 1973, Bosselman, Callies and Banta concluded that even an over-
ruling of Pennsylvania Coal would not prevent courts from applying vari-
able standards of reasonableness as measured by individual losses. In the
long run, they claimed, the most effective strategy would be to spend more
time in drafting regulations and preparing factual bases. 300 Contrary to the
expectations of these authors, however, there is strong evidence that courts
are escaping the gravitational pull of the police power-taking continuum and
returning to a conception resembling the Mugler test. In HFH, Ltd. v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles301 the California Supreme Court upheld a
demurrer to a complaint in which plaintiff landowners sought to force the
city to purchase their development rights, which were allegedly taken when
their parcels were downzoned from commercial to low-density residential
uses.302 In other words, plaintiffs alleged that the city had proceeded too far
down the police power-taking continuum and that the zoning scheme con-
stituted a taking.
Plaintiffs had purchased their land for $388,000 when it was zoned
commercial and received approval for a commercial subdivision. 303 They
did not, however, proceed- with development and five years later a
moratorium on development was imposed. When plaintiffs asked for rein-
statement of their approval to develop, the city rezoned the land to low-
density residential, reducing its value to $75,000, less than twenty percent
of its commercial use value.
304
In rejecting this use of inverse condemnation to recover damages, the
court acknowledged the accepted principle that "landowners have no vested
rights in existing or anticipated zoning ordinances." 30 5 More important, the
298. THE TAKING ISSUE, supra note 293, at 120.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 327. In this same year, 1973, Professor Large published an article in which he
convincingly argued for a new, more communal view of land. Large, This Land Is Whose
Land? Changing Concepts of Land as Property, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 1039.
301. 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975). Berger, supra note 288, at 820-
21, cites HFH as an example of how difficult it is to assess "reasonable beneficial use." He
calls HFH "enormously significant." Id. at 820.
302. 15 Cal. 3d at 512, 517-18, 542 P.2d at 239-40, 243-44, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 367-68, 371-72.
303. Id. at 512, 542 P.2d at 239-40, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 367-68.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 516, 542 P.2d at 242, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
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court held that plaintiffs had misinterpreted the phrase providing compensa-
tion for damaged property in the California constitution. 306 "Intended to
reach situations in which government activity damaged land without taking
it, the provision in question does not apply to this case, in which undamaged
land has allegedly suffered only a diminution in value."30 7 Thus, according
to HFH, mere diminution in value is not compensable, at least in California.
That TDR is a pure police-power regulation that will not be forced onto
the Procrustean bed of the police power-taking continuum is made clear by
the New York Court of Appeals decision in Tudor Parks. 3 8 The court cuts
through the moraine left by Pennsylvania Coal to the firmer footing of strict
construction:
As noted above, when the State "takes", that is appropriates,
private property for public use, just compensation must be paid. In
contrast, when there is only regulation of the uses of private
property, no compensation need be paid. Of course, and this is
often the beginning of confusion, a purported "regulation" may
impose so onerous a burden on the property regulated that it has, in
effect, deprived the owner of the reasonable income productive or
other private use of his property and thus has destroyed its
economic value. In all but exceptional cases, nevertheless, such a
regulation does not constitute a "taking", and is therefore not
compensable, but amounts to a deprivation or frustration of pro-
perty rights without due process of law and is therefore invalid.
In the present case, while there was a significant diminution in
the value of the property, there was no actual appropriation or
taking of the parks by title or governmental occupation. The
amendment was declared void at Special Term a little over a year
after its adoption. There was no physical invasion of the owner's
306. California's constitution is more liberal than federal law in providing compensation
for taking or damaging property. Compare CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § 19 ("Private property may be
taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless
waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the owner.") with U.S. CONST. amend. V
("Nor shall any private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.") Argu-
ably, therefore, while the decision in HFH is binding only on California courts, the wisdom of
the holding is relevant for courts in many other jurisdictions. Since the federal courts have
considered relatively few planning law cases, the state decisions often have great effect
throughout the country. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), is an example of a recent case with such an effect. See note 275
supra for a discussion of this case. At least one knowledgeable commentator believes HFH to
be "enormously significant." See Berger, supra note 288, at 820.
307. 15 Cal. 3d at 517-18, 542 P.2d at 244, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372 (emphasis added).
308. The Tudor Parks case is discussed at text accompanying notes 103-16 supra. Norman
Marcus sees the use of TDR at Tudor Parks as a legitimate and justifiable use of the police
power. Marcus, Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause: The Case of
Manhattan's Tudor City Parks, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 77, 78, 104-05 (1974). See also Gerstell,
Needed: A Landmark Decision, 8 URB. L. 21 (1976).
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property; nor was there an assumption by the city of the control or
management of the parks. Indeed, the parks served the same func-
tion as before the amendment, except that they were now also open
to the public. Absent factors of governmental displacement of
private ownership, occupation or management, there was no "tak-
ing" within the meaning of constitutional limitations. . . .There
was, therefore, no right to compensation as for a taking in eminent
domain.309
But, as discussed earlier, 310 the plan was declared unreasonable and there-
fore invalid because it placed the entire burden of preservation on a single
property owner. The reason this burden fell on the owner was that the
market for development rights was too uncertain. While the court mentions
the possibility of using development rights banks, taxation policy, and
eminent domain as possible solutions, it leaves open the door to innovative
strategies by adding to the list: "other devices which will insure rudimen-
tary fairness in the allocation of economic burdens." 311 The court does not
hold TDR invalid, it merely rejects the plan for failing to ensure a ready
market for the development rights. Arguably, if the transfer zone were
larger, the density bonus greater, the real estate market stronger and the
processing of transfer requests more expedient, the sale of development
rights would have been ensured and the amendment valid. The opinion
cannot be read to require the use of banks with mandatory schemes-it only
asks that planners "insure rudimentary fairness."
312
In sum, an attempt to develop an "accommodation power" or any
other restructured view of the public right to control development will be of
questionable value to TDR planners.313 Even a return to strict construction
will not eliminate the difficulties of measuring and allocating compensatory
development rights. Of significant importance, however, is the judicial
movement toward strict construction of the taking clause. 314 Judge Breitel's
clarification of the relationship of TDR regulations to the taking issue in the
Tudor Parks decision goes far toward developing more workable criteria for
judicial review of innovative development guidance instruments. TDR oper-
ates in volatile real property markets in highly valued urban locations and in
the developing fringe areas where there is a high ratio between potential use
value and existing use value. Under these circumstances, carefully planned
309. 39 N.Y.2d at 593-94, 350 N.E.2d at 384-86, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 8-9.
310. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
311. 39 N.Y.2d at 600, 350 N.E.2d at 389, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
312. Id. The New York Court of Appeals decision in the Grand Central case provides
additional guidance as to the outlines of an acceptable mandatory TDR program. See text
accompanying notes 117-20 supra.
313. See text accompanying notes 285-92 supra.
314. See text accompanying notes 301-12 supra.
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programs are likely to cause significant shifts in property value. Judge
Breitel tells planners that the courts will accept some diminution in value
and not invoke the taking issue, but that TDR programs must reflect fairness
in the allocation of costs and must work effectively. TDR programs that do
not work may misallocate the burden of costs and are therefore invalid.
VI. MAKiNG TDR WORK
In the overview of TDR programs, it was seen that the successes and
near-successes have occurred in areas at the developing fringe and in
programs that are limited in scope and directed only toward preserving
farmland and open space. The discussion of TDR economics revealed that
existing PDR-only programs are grossly inefficient and that TDR programs
will not be used unless they provide adequate economic incentives. But the
fine-tuning of economic incentives conflicts with the need for administra-
tively simple programs.
In addition, planners must shoot at moving targets-the development
process never assumes a point of static equilibrium. It is dynamic and not
'fully understood, making it difficult to produce accurate, long-range fore-
casts of the timing and sequence of development. A workable TDR program
can cease functioning over time simply because of changes in the market.
Therefore, a workable TDR program should not only incorporate the
foresight of adequate planning, but should also be flexible enough for at
least limited operation during periods of unanticipated market failure.
A workable program that not only avoids confrontation with the myth
of the taking issue but also includes an economically efficient marginal
pricing strategy and guarantees preservation of critical areas even when
TDR incentives fail, would take the following form. First, the plan would be
basically voluntary. Most of the successful TDR programs are voluntary and
as such have not been the object of judicial challenge. While the decisions in
the Grand Central315 and Tudor Parks316 cases do begin to define the outlines
of judicially acceptable mandatory programs, it would be best to avoid
judicial confrontation at this early stage. 317
315. 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977). See text accompanying
notes 97-102, 117-20 supra for a discussion of this case.
316. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1973). See text accompanying notes
103-16 supra for a discussion of this case.
317. The choice to avoid judicial confrontation is admittedly subjective. Decisions against
TDR would certainly retard development of the concept. On the other hand, decisions validat-
ing TDR would be helpful. Even favorable holdings, however, could reduce innovation by
perpetuating existing TDR forms when more effort should be made to experiment with new
variants.
1978] TDR
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Second, the preservation objectives would be limited in order to avoid
the administrative complexities of an approach providing a complete substi-
tute for zoning318 and to prevent the problem of development rights that are
interchangeable among various land uses.319 The valuation and allocation of
development rights should be kept simple. It is difficult and undesirable to
propose a single valuation standard and allocation formula because the
choice depends not only on the preservation objectives but also on the
resources available to those administering the TDR program. 320 In many
instances, however, in which limited TDR programs are proposed for use in
small communities at the developing fringe, valuation and allocation will
most likely be on the basis of density and acreage.
321
Third, careful planning will be necessary to ensure that adequate
incentives are achievable during most periods and that transfer area residents
are not unreasonably burdened by higher densities. Although the concern
over the effect of increases in transfer area density has arisen principally
with mandatory programs in urban areas, 322 the problem is no less important
in rural areas. Again, there can be no simple formula for determining what is
an acceptable increase in transfer area density. The TDR planner should
seek the broadest 'public input, debate and support in the design of the
incentive structure and the delimitation of transfer zones and their density
limits.
Fourth, attempts should also be made to overcome the exclusionary
effects inherent in TDR. Inclusionary provisions could be tied to the TDR
provisions-for example, requiring fewer development rights for the density
bonus when the housing is targeted for low and moderate income groups.
323
The objective should be more than simple avoidance of exclusionary effects.
Heretofore, TDR has been conceived as merely a means toward preserving
valued amenities. The incentive structure that makes TDR work, however,
can be used as a positive force to further other social and planning goals, just
as the bonuses available with some density zoning techniques have en-
couraged the development of residential communities with a mixture of
housing types.
324
318. See notes 153-58 and accompanying text supra.
319. See text accompanying notes 156-58 supra.
320. See notes 234-38 and accompanying text supra.
321. See note 238 and accompanying text supra.
322. See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra.
323. See notes 279-80 and accompanying text supra.
324. While a mixture of housing types within a wide range of cost is an objective of planned
unit development ordinances, this mixture has not always been achieved. see note 14 supra.
[Vol. 56
1978] TDR
Thus far, the outlines of a workable plan are little more than reflections
of lessons learned from existing programs. What distinguishes the workable
plan proposed here from other TDR programs is the application of a concept
accepted in other areas of law, but novel to TDR-the right of first refusal.
This right, when included in corporate charters, bylaws or shareholder
agreements, provides a corporation or its shareholders with the first option
to buy corporate stock before any shareholder may sell or transfer his shares
to a third party. 3" The right of first refusal is particularly important for the
close corporation that wants to avoid the entry of unwanted shareholders or
to prevent a major shift in control. 326 More on point, right of first refusal
provisions are to be found in cooperative and condominium housing ar-
rangements. 327 They typically require the seller to give notice to the associa-
tion before transferring his interest. The association then has some period in
which to exercise its option or give approval for the transfer. This restraint
on alienation has been sustained "when it is reasonably designed to attain or
encourage accepted social or economic ends.' '328
325. For a description of how the right of first refusal is used to protect stockholders from
the sale of stock to persons deemed undesirable, see Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp., 17 Del.
Ch. 343, 152 A. 723 (1930).
326. See, e.g., Tu-Vu Drive-In Corp. v. Ashkins, 61 Cal. 2d 283,391 P.2(1828, 38 Cal. Rptr.
348 (1964), which upheld a by-law restricting alienation against a nonconsenting stockholder
who acquired his stock prior to the enactment of the by-law. TDR does not violate the principle
that zoning cannot be by contract. In Tu-Vu Drive-In it was held that the stockholder should
have anticipated changes in the by-laws and in HFH the California court noted the accepted
view that landowners have no vested rights in the zoning status quo. 15 Cal. 3d at 516, 542 P.2d
at 242, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 370. Thus, the right of first refusal, although it appears to be an option
of sorts, is more correctly characterized as a regulation akin to an amended corporate by-law or
a local zone change.
327. Many cooperative and condominium statutes permit restraints on alienation as a
necessary safeguard to protect the social and economic structure of the project. See P. ROHAN
& M. RESKIN, I (pt.l) REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, CONDOMINIUM LAW & PRACTICE §
13.03[5][b], at 13-23 (1969). It is not simply a matter of picking congenial neighbors. In a
cooperative, there is usually a single mortgage and if a few financially irresponsible members do
not pay their monthly charges, the entire project can be put in risk of foreclosure. In con-
dominiums, while there are individual mortgages for each unit, unit owners pay monthly
assessments for maintenance of the common areas and are responsible for running the associa-
tion. It has been this author's personal experience from working with several condominium
associations that, as the saying goes, a few bad apples can spoil the barrel and literally threaten
the continuing existence of the condominium as a community of homeowners. According to
some commentators, the "[r]ight of first refusal, whereby bona fide offers received by a unit
owner may be matched by the association within a relatively short period, usually ten to thirty
days after notification to the board of managers, . . . does not appear to be unduly burden-
some." Id. § 13.03[5][b], at 13-24. The right of first refusal as proposed in this section is,
therefore, more than simply a means of notification. It is a system intended to ensure that the
community will develop in an orderly manner consistent with the expectations of local citizens.
328. Gale v. York Center Community Coop., 21111. 2d 86, 92, 171 N.E.2d 30, 33 (1960).
The statute which prohibits discrimination in co-operatives because of race, color,
religion, national origin or ancestry is not involved in this case. Absent the application
of these statutory standards, and under the terms of the agreement between plaintiff
and Gilbert [the prospective buyer], there is no reason why the owners of the co-
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A workable TDR plan would give the planning board or similar body
the right of first refusal on the purchase of development rights from any
property in the preservation zone. A landowner who had not already trans-
ferred the development rights under the plan and who had entered into a
bona fide sales agreement for the conveyance of an interest in the property
exceeding that which would remain after stripping the development
rights, 3 29 would be required to give notice to the town of the impending sale.
The town could decline the option and give permission for the conveyance,
do nothing and, at the end of the statutory period, allow the conveyance to
occur, or, finally, purchase the development rights, negotiating for the
price.
330
The point of conveyance is the earliest practicable time in the devel-
opment process for public authorities to intervene. The decision to have
TDR review at this stage is based on the belief that many conveyances are
involuntary-forced either by land economics or changes in the lives of
resident land owners. In some cases, intervention and purchase of devel-
opment rights may permit present owners to continue in possession to their
benefit and the community's advantage. TDR planners should hope, howev-
er, that the deus ex machina intervention of the right of first refusal willbe
unnecessary-that their voluntary programs will work unaided. The right of
first refusal is of importance only during periods of private market failure
and clearly admits the obvious-that even carefully designed voluntary
TDR programs may sometimes fail to protect land that is critical to a town's
open space plan.
One important, and perhaps incorrect, assumption that underlies this
right of first refusal proposal is that landowners sell their property to
developers. 33' The procedures are designed to intervene when the parcel is
operative apartment house could not decide for themselves with whom they wish to
share their elevators, their common halls and facilities, their stockholders' meetings,
their management problems and responsibilities and their homes.
Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 426, 434, 160 N.E.2d 720, 724, 190 N.Y.S.2d 70, 75
(1959).
329. That is, lesser interests not inconsistent with open space uses could be conveyed, for
example, easements of access.
330. This procedure does not preclude the use of the condemnation power by the town, but
if eminent domain is used to purchase the development rights, the town will have to meet the
public use/public purpose test. See Courtesy Sandwich Shops, Inc. v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 12
N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 (1963).
331. There is some indication that often principal land holders at the developing fringe are
speculators. See M. CLAWSON, supra note 2, at 62; Gupte, Suffolk Legislature Kills Plan to
Preserve East End Farms, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1976, at 45, col. 1. Inherent also in the right of
first refusal approach is the assumption that the net cost of TDR with occasional PDR under
conditions of market failure is less than the net cost of PDR on all open land or some types of
open land. It has been argued that a pure PDR approach is most efficient economically if
development rights are taken only from land not yet ripe for development. Note, Techniquesfor
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being conveyed. There will be cases, however, in which the present owner
develops his land solely or partially by himself; therefore, it may be
necessary to tie the right of first refusal into subdivision approval and
building permit issuance. The sole purpose of the tie-in would be to refer the
property owner to the TDR review procedure. All notification of pending
development could be accomplished through the process of subdivision
approval and building permit issuance. Earlier notification is preferred,
however, because notification before sale permits the town to intercede in
time and help a land owner who would stay on the land if the development
rights were sold.
One obvious problem with notification at the time of conveyance is that
the sale and purchase of an interest in real property does not necessarily
result in conversion of the land to more intensive uses. If the new owner
does not intend to develop the property, purchase of the development rights
would be wasteful. To assist in clarifying the situation, the TDR review
procedure could include a requirement that the prospective buyer indicate
how the property is to be used.332 Four situations are possible. First, the
prospective buyer indicates that no change will be made in the use of the
property and, after purchasing the property, no change is made. Second, at
the time of the conveyance, no change is indicated, but the property is later
proposed for development. Third, development is intended and if the sale
goes ahead with the development rights intact, development is subsequently
proposed. Fourth, development is intended, but the town purchases the
development rights and, therefore, no development occurs.
In the first situation, the town would not purchase the development
rights, preservation funds would be saved and the land would remain in its
present use. There might be some injury to the seller, however, if he would
have remained in possession had the town purchased the development
rights.
In the second situation, the town would not purchase the development
rights at the time of proposed sale of the property, but when the new owner
requested subdivision approval or a building permit, the town would again
conduct a TDR review. The expenditure of preservation funds would be
delayed. Here too the seller may suffer some damage, but no more than he
would experience if a right of first refusal provision was not in effect.
Preserving Open Spaces, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1622, 1637 (1962). But there is yet to be an empirical
analysis of any type of open space PDR or TDR program.
332. Right of first refusal provisions in cooperative and condominium by-laws may require
that the seller provide the directors of the homeowners' association with certain information
including "such other information as the Association may reasonably require." By-laws of the
Meadow Hill Condominium Homeowners' Association, art. X, § 2 (n.d.) (Glastonbury, Conn.).
1978] TDR
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In the third situation, the town would give serious consideration to
purchasing the development rights. If it decided not to purchase the devel-
opment rights, the sale could be completed. If development was subsequent-
ly proposed, there would be a second TDR review. Allowing the sale to be
completed in this case gives the town an advantage. On the second review,
the type of proposed development will be clear and the town will be able to
judge how much damage the change would do to the preservation area.
Once again, the seller can suffer some loss.
This strategy (allowing the sale and taking a second review) appears to
present at least one difficulty. The developer is placed in a highly disadvan-
tageous position, since he will be allowed to purchase the land with its
development rights intact, only to risk losing the right to develop when
requesting subdivision approval or a building permit. For the developer, the
simple solution is to request subdivision approval or the building permit at
the time the conveyance is proposed. This can be done by the common
practice of purchasing an option on the property subject to the granting of
subdivision approval or the building permit. Proceeding in this manner
would prevent the developer from having to submit to a second review and
would protect the present owner by allowing him to remain in possession if
the town did purchase the development rights.
In the fourth situation, the right of first refusal does its intended job-it
prevents development of land in the preservation area and allows the present
owner to continue his ownership if he desires to do so.
If development rights are purchased by the town, they can be exting-
uished as in conventional PDR programs or sold to transfer zone developers.
In most instances, however, the request for permission to convey will result
from the inability to complete transfers of development rights in the private
market and, therefore, when the right of first refusal is used, it is unlikely
that immediate resale of the development rights will be possible. Thus, the
right of first refusal concept differs from the Chicago Plan33 3 and the Puerto
Rico Plan334 in that its use is extraordinary and intended only to stop
conversion of critical areas when there has been a failure of private market
incentives. If the planning is at fault, then the variables of development
rights supply and demand could be altered, for example, by increasing the
size of the transfer zone, by downzoning the transfer zone or by increasing
the maximum density allowed with development rights.335 In the meantime,
333. See text accompanying notes 134-45 supra.
334. See text accompanying notes 159-64 supra.
335. See text accompanying note 242 supra.
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the community could avoid the conversion without having to maintain a full-
scale development rights bank as required in the Costonis plans.33 6 From the
standpoint of economic efficiency, the right of first refusal approach is more
sensible than wide-area purchase of development rights because it operates
at the margin-that is, only on those parcels or portions of parcels that are
threatened with immediate development.
The right of first refusal provision is similar in some respects to the
power of eminent domain. For example, the right of first refusal approach is
based on the principle that private property rights can be taken for public
purposes if the owners are adequately compensated. The important differ-
ence between the right of first refusal and the condemnation power is that
the former technique automatically identifies those parcels most likely to be
developed. 337 A program based solely on eminent domain would require that
local government correctly identify those lands that are both necessary to
meet the objectives of the preservation program and likely to be converted.
Many areas are valuable as open space but do not need to have their
development rights stripped away by the condemnation power because the
owner is not willing to sell the land to a developer or because there are no
willing buyers. Why bother to waste limited preservation funds when the
land will remain in its present use regardless?
The unnecessary purchase of development rights is at the center of the
economic problems of TDR plans.338 The right of first refusal is a marginal
strategy. It allows the town to look at each parcel right before conversion. In
the example set out in figure 1,339 Farmer would report to Town that he and
Developer had signed a sales agreement for twenty acres. Town would then
decide whether or not to buy the development rights on the twenty acres to
stop the conversion. The cost of these rights, as was discussed, would be
much less than the cost of buying the development rights from the entire
parcel. But won't Farmer and Developer enter into another sales agreement
on twenty acres of the remaining land? Probably not, for with the devel-
opment rights on the marginal twenty acres sold, Farmer is moved up and
back on the value of marginal product (VMP) curve and will be willing to
sell twenty acres only if Developer offers more than he did for the marginal
twenty acres. Developer will look elsewhere for a site for his "El Rancho"
336. See text accompanying note 140 supra. Some funds will have to be available for the
purchase of development rights. For suggestions on financing the purchases, see note 273 and
accompanying text supra.
337. In addition, eminent domain requires that the public use test be met. See note 330
supra.
338. See, e.g., notes 253-54 and accompanying text supra.
339. See text accompanying notes 252-54 supra.
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subdivision until he selects one outside of a preservation zone or one that
Town decides is not worth spending the money to preserve.
The marginal right of first refusal approach is therefore an efficient
technique because it maximizes the land area that can be preserved during
periods of TDR market failure. Moreover, it is an effective allocator of land
use because it contemplates continuing competition between private devel-
opers and public preservers.'Eminent domain, on the other hand, is anticom-
petitive and provides the local government with a molnopsony. The demon-
stration that imperfect competition in the extreme form of monopoly or
monopsony results in the inefficient allocation of scarce resources is best left
for an introductory text in microeconomics. 3 ° It is enough to say that,
compared to eminent domain, TDR is potentially a better allocator of land
use.34 1 Finally, it should be reiterated that the right of first refusal provision
is proposed to serve only as an escape hatch under conditions of market
failure when voluntary private transfers of development rights are insuffi-
cient to preserve designated farmland and open space.
VII. CONCLUSION AND A COMMENT ON THE CRITICAL ROLE FOR PLANNING
The development process in America is destroying irreplaceable re-
sources in our man-made and natural environments. 342 Preservationists are
only just beginning to make effective use of TDR as a strategy of interven-
tion intended to close the windfall-wipeout loop in the interest of public
welfare. The realization that existing development guidance instruments are
inadequate, 343 the increasing acceptance of the proposition that numerous
legal antecedents support the use of TDR,344 the recognition of TDR in the
courts345 and the escalation of state and local experimentation' have all
contributed to rapid development of interest in TDR. General ignorance of
340. For a readable introduction to the subject, see R. DORFMAN, PRICES AND MARKETS
201-07 (2d ed. 1972).
341. If TDR provides a competitive market for the allocation of development, if eminent
domain is an exercise of monopsony, and if competitive markets allocate scarce resources
better than markets dominated by monopolists, monopsonists, oligopolists or oligopsonists,
then TDR will better allocate an area's development potential. For an argument that planners
should rid themselves of zoning altogether in favor of private market controls over devel-
opment, see B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING 231-47 (1972).
342. "Past architectural achievements, regardless of their cultural significance to yesterday
or tomorrow, are callously blown away-just so much dust on some appraiser's roll-top desk."
Legner, Putting Landmarks on a FirmerFooting, 140 ARCHITECTURAL F., Jan.-Feb. 1974, at 56.
"'When a man despoils a work of art we call him a vandal, when he despoils a work of
nature we call him a developer.' "B. ROUECHE, WHAT'S LEFT 45 (1968) (quoting Joseph Wood
Krutch).
343. See notes 6-20 and accompanying text supra.
344. See notes 43-63 and accompanying text supra.
345. See notes 95-132 and accompanying text supra.
346. See notes 153-238 and accompanying text supra.
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both the process and economics of land conversion and lack of experience
with TDR economics, however, have made it difficult to ensure that TDR
programs will work. One alternative is to compensate for market failure and
increase flexibility with a right of first refusal provision.
All these problems and prospects point to the need for adequate plan-
ning. 47 Planning is essential to the creation of enabling legislation and local
provisions that not only optimize innovation while avoiding exclusionary
effects, but prevent legal failure and ensure the adequacy of economic
incentives. Planning for the implementation of TDR programs is vital if
disruption of the private market is to be avoided and if political acceptance is
to be achieved.
347. "TDR is not a substitute for sound planning and forceful implementation. Rather, it
complements planning policies by providing solutions to political and economic problems
created in certain situations." Manzer, Transfer of Development Rights, 24 COMMUNITY PLAN.
REV., Dec. 1974, at 4, 6. The need for adequate planning is evident by the Council on
Environmental Quality's assessment of the present state of TDR: "Given the gaps in existing
research and the obvious problems of implementing poorly conceived transfer programs,
extensive investigation, research, and experimentation are necessary before such a system is
widely adopted." COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, FIFrH ANNUAL REPORT 59 (1974). See
also Gruen, The Need for Continued Sound Planning, in PAS, supra note 32, at 34. Whether the
optimal jurisdictional level for TDR planning is local, regional or state has not been widely
discussed in the literature and is beyond the scope of this paper. It is noteworthy, however, that
only one article argues for a regional approach. Deane, The Potentialfor Planning Injustice, in
PAS, supra note 32, at 52.
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